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Kurzfassung
In dieser Arbeit wird das Leistungsvermögen der Sicherheit auf der
physikalischen Schicht anhand von zwei speziellen Systemmodellen un-
tersucht. Im Detail werden Beamforming- und Absicherungsstrategien
im gaußschen Multiple-Input Single-Output (MISO) Wiretap Channel
(WTC) und dem gaußschen Two-hop Relay WTC mit mehreren Anten-
nen am Sender und Empfänger studiert. In beiden Systemmodellen
wird der Einfluss von partieller Kanalkenntnis zum Abhörer betrachtet
und die so erreichbaren Sicherheitsraten mit denen verglichen, die bei
voller Kanalkenntnis erreichbar sind.
Für den MISO WTC kann gezeigt werden, dass für Kanäle mit schnellem
Schwund der Beamforming-Vektor in Hinblick auf die ergodische Sicher-
heitsrate unter Berücksichtigung des Grades der Kanalkenntnis opti-
miert werden kann. Zudem kann durch die intelligente Verwendung von
künstlichem Rauschen (Artificial Noise, AN) die ergodische Sicherheit-
srate signifikant erhöht werden. Hierbei nimmt der Grad der Kanalken-
ntnis direkt Einfluss auf die Aufteilung der Leistung zwischen Daten-
und AN-Signal am Sender sowie auch auf die Richtung, in der das
AN-Signal gesendet wird. Zudem kann gezeigt werden, dass dieselben
Beamforming- und Absicherungsstrategien ebenfalls die Sicherheits-
ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit für Kanäle mit langsamem Schwund min-
imieren.
Im gaußschen Two-hop Relay WTC wird Information Leakage Neu-
tralization (IN) als neuartige Absicherungsstrategie eingeführt. Diese
Absicherungsstrategie erreicht nahezu dieselben instantanen Raten wie
ein friedvolles System ohne Abhörer, wenn es bei voller Kanalkenntnis
am Sender eingesetzt wird. Weiterhin sind durch die IN-Absicherungs-
strategie höhere Raten erreichbar als durch den Einsatz von AN. Zusätz-
lich kann im Fall von voller Kanalkenntnis auf den Einsatz von Wiretap-
Codes verzichtet werden. Auch im Fall partieller Kanalkenntnis, wo der
Sender nur eine veraltete Schätzung des Kanals zwischen Relay und Ab-
hörer besitzt, kann gezeigt werden, dass die IN-Absicherungsstrategie
angewendet werden kann. Hierbei hängt es jedoch stark von den Kanal-
realisierungen und dem Alter der Kanalschätzung ab, ob die IN- oder die
AN-Absicherungsstrategie bessere Ergebnisse bringt und daher ange-
wandt werden sollte.
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Abstract
Within this thesis, we investigate the possibilities of physical layer se-
crecy for two special system models. In detail, we study beamforming
and protection strategies in the Multiple-Input Single-Output (MISO)
Gaussian Wiretap Channel (WTC) and the Gaussian two-hop relay WTC
with multiple antennas at transmitter and receiver. In both system mod-
els, we examine the influence of partial Channel State Information (CSI)
on the link to the eavesdropper and compare the achievable secrecy rates
with the case of full CSI.
We show for the MISO WTC that in the fast fading scenario the Beam-
forming Vector (BV) can be optimized such that the ergodic secrecy rate
is maximized with regard to the degree of channel knowledge. Further
we show that the ergodic secrecy rate can be significantly increased by
usage of Artificial Noise (AN), if applied in a smart way. This means
that the degree of channel knowledge on the link to the eavesdropper
influences the portion of power that is spent for AN at the transmitter
as well as the direction, in which the AN signal is sent. In addition,
we apply the same beamforming and protection strategies to the slow
fading scenario and find that these techniques also reduce the secrecy
outage probability.
For the two-hop relay WTC, we introduce Information Leakage Neutra-
lization (IN) as a new protection strategy. If applied to a system model,
where the transmitter has full CSI, the instantaneous secrecy rate per-
forms almost as well as the instantaneous capacity of the peaceful system
without an eavesdropper. The IN protected scheme outperforms the AN
protected approach and performs much better than any beamforming
scheme without additional protection mechanism. Another positive
aspect of the IN protected scheme in the case of full CSI is that conven-
tional channel codes can be applied instead of wiretap codes. For the
case of partial CSI, where the transmitter has only an outdated estimate
on the channel between relay and the eavesdropper, we show that the
IN protected scheme can also be applied. Here, it strongly depends on
the channel realizations and the delay of the estimate, whether the IN or
the AN protection scheme should be applied.
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PART I
INTRODUCTION
1 Motivation
In modern communication systems wireless technologies are more and
more utilized. The advantage of the wireless medium, that mobile users
are able to communicate from every point within the range of the base
station, is accompanied by the disadvantage that this is also valid for
any kind of eavesdropper.
During the last years, the interest in secrecy of communication is grow-
ing. The various scandals with regard to the intelligence services of
different countries, mainly publicized by Edward Snowden1, showed
how easily communication can be wiretapped and overheard. As a re-
sult, many security related projects were further developed and revised
for security problems. All of these projects are based on conventional
cryptography, and some of them, e.g., OpenSSL2, were found to have
serious flaws in the implementation, in the case of OpenSSL the Heart-
bleed Bug3, which allowed the eavesdropper to undermine the security
of the provided tool.
Additionally, most cryptographic tools, which aim to increase the secrecy
of private communication, require some understanding of the under-
lying mechanisms or at least some interaction between user and tool.
First of all, the user needs to choose whether to take an asymmetric
algorithm, also known as public key cryptography, or a symmetric al-
gorithm. For the asymmetric algorithm, a key pair has to be generated
initially consisting of a private key, which serves to decipher messages
and needs to be kept secret, and a public key, which can be used by
everyone in order to encipher messages. If we take GnuPG4 as an ex-
ample for such an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm, the user has
to choose the encryption algorithm and the key length of the key pair,
which requires some knowledge about up to date recommendations and
1A good overview on the revelations done by Edward Snowden can be found at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden.
2https://www.openssl.org
3http://heartbleed.com
4https://www.gnupg.org
3security risks, in order to generate a good key pair, which guarantees
secure communication for the next few years. Further, the user needs to
publish the public key in an appropriate way.
For symmetric algorithms, only one key for encryption and decryption
of a message is needed. Nevertheless, this key must be shared between
transmitter and receiver in a secure way before a communication can be
established. This also means, that every user, who wants to communicate
with another user at any time in the future, already needs to share a
secret key with him.
Further, up to now, there is only one information-theoretically secure en-
cryption algorithm known. A cryptographic system is called information-
theoretically secure if its security derives solely from the information
theory. Further, an eavesdropper is not able to break the system with
unlimited computational power.
This information-theoretically secure encryption algorithm is called One
Time Pad (OTP) or Vernam Chiffre (see Chapter 2 for details). Unfortu-
nately, due to the restriction that every key has to be used only once, this
algorithm is not suitable for most applications in everyday life.
Therefore, we can summarize the following problems with regard to
conventional cryptographic tools.
• The implementation of often complex cryptographic algorithm
might be insecure.
• Setting up a cryptographic tool for secure communication might
need some knowledge of the underlying mechanism by and the
interaction with the user.
• In the case of symmetric cryptography, the key for communication
needs to be shared beforehand.
• For everyday life suitable cryptographic algorithms do not provide
information-theoretically secrecy.
During the last years, another approach to information-theoretically
secrecy, which is located on the physical layer, is vividly discussed in
literature. The basics for this novel approach were laid by Wyner in 1975
in his seminal paper [Wyn75]. This new method has the potential to
overcome the before mentioned problems of conventional cryptography,
as no key is needed and therefore no interaction between user and tool is
necessary. Further, the realization of secrecy mechanisms on the physical
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layer simplifies the implementation, which increases the security of the
approach.
One scenario of modern communication, where such secrecy mecha-
nisms can be helpful is the downlink transmission in mobile communi-
cation, where a base station with multiple-antennas transmits messages
to mobile users, which have only single antenna each. If one of these
messages is a private message, which is intended for only a single mo-
bile user, all other mobile users within the range of the base station are
eavesdroppers to this transmission link. This scenario is known as the
Multiple-Input Single-Output (MISO) wiretap channel.
Within this thesis, we will analyze the possibilities of physical layer
secrecy for two special MISO system models. The thesis is organized
in three parts. In Part I, some basic results on physical layer secrecy
are revised and presented. Further, all necessary tools and measures
are introduced, that will be used for the analysis in the following parts.
In Part II, we will investigate beamforming and protection strategies
for the MISO Gaussian Wiretap Channel (WTC) with partial Channel
State Information (CSI). The two-hop relay WTC with full and partial
CSI is examined in Part III. Again, we study beamforming and protec-
tion strategies, where we introduce the novel approach of Information
Leakage Neutralization (IN). All results are illustrated by numerical
results.
2 Secrecy Rate and Secrecy Capacity
In 1949, Shannon establishes in his seminal paper [Sha49] information-
theoretically secure communication. Within this paper, he proofed the
information-theoretically secrecy of a symmetric cryptographic algo-
rithm which is nowadays well known as One Time Pad (OTP), if used
digitally, or Vernam Chiffre, for any other group greater than 2. This
cryptographic algorithm was invented during the 1920s by Gilbert S.
Vernam and Joseph O. Mauborgne.
(2.1) Definition (One Time Pad).
A message sequence m can be transmitted perfectly (information-theo-
retically) secure over an unsecure channel, if every bit i of the message
m is encrypted by a function1
c[i] = m[i] + k[i] mod 2 ∀i ∈ [1, |m|]
and the key k satisfies the following conditions:
1. the key k needs to be at least as long as the message m, i.e., |k| ≥
|m|,
2. the key k needs to be a random sequence, which is independent
and identically distributed,
3. the key k is only used once to encrypt a message, and
4. the key k needs to be exchanged securely between transmitter and
receiver beforehand. X
These conditions are combined in the following lemma.
(2.2) Corollary (Crypto Lemma2).
Let (G,+) be a compact abelian group with binary operation +, and let
C = M + K, where M and K are random variables over G and K is
1The encryption function can be an arbitrary function that follows certain conditions. As
the design of these functions is not in the focus of this thesis, this example shall be
sufficient for illustration. Please refer to [Sha49] for details on the design of encryption
functions.
2Lemma 2 in [For03].
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independent of M and uniform over G. Then C is independent of M
and uniform over G. X
The last condition of Definition (2.1) on the key k is quite unfortunate, as
secure communication is only possible if transmitter and receiver have
already shared key bits. The secrecy rate and secrecy capacity have the
potential to overcome this disadvantage.
2.1 Degraded Wiretap Channel
As early as 1975, Wyner introduced in [Wyn75] the Wiretap Channel
(WTC), where a transmitter, Alice, wants to send a confidential mes-
sage to a receiver, Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper, Eve. This
system model was meant to work for a wired connection, where the
eavesdropper is wiretapping the signal at the receiver, i.e., Eve only
gets a degraded version of Bob’s receive signal. This channel model is
depicted in Figure 2.1 and was named in the literature the Degraded
Wiretap Channel (DWTC).
Alice main channel
X
Bob
Evewiretap channel
Y
Z
Figure 2.1: The degraded WTC.
Formally, a discrete memoryless DWTC (X , pZ|Y pY |X ,Y,Z) consists of
the finite input alphabet X , the two finite output alphabets Y and Z and
the transition probabilities of two Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMC),
i.e., pY |X for the main and pZ|Y for the wiretap channel, such that
∀n ≥ 1 ∀(xn, yn, zn) ∈ Xn × Yn ×Zn
pY nZn|Xn(yn, zn|xn) =
n∏
i=1
pY |X(yi|xi)pZ|Y (zi|yi). (2.1)
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(2.3) Definition (Wiretap Code3).
A (2nRS , n) code Cn of a DWTC (X , pZ|Y pY |X ,Y,Z) consists of
• a message setM∈ {1, . . . , 2nR},
• a source of local randomness at the encoder (R, pR),
• an encoding function f :M×R→ Xn, which maps a message m
and a realization of the local randomness r to a codeword xn, and
• a decoding function g : Yn →M∪ {e}, which maps each channel
observation yn to a message mˆ ∈M or an error message e. X
The reliability of a code Cn is measured in terms of its average probability
of error
Pe(Cn) , Pr
(
Mˆ 6= M |Cn
)
. (2.2)
The secrecy of a code Cn is measured either in terms of the leakage of
information to the eavesdropper
L(Cn) , I(M ;Zn|Cn) (2.3)
or, equivalently, in terms of the equivocation, i.e., the uncertainty at the
eavesdropper
E(Cn) , H(M |ZnCn) . (2.4)
(2.4) Definition (Weak Secrecy4).
A weak secrecy rate-equivocation pair (RS , Re) is achievable for the
DWTC if there exists a sequence of (2nRS , n) codes {Cn}n≥1 such that
lim
n→∞Pe(Cn) = 0 (reliability condition), (2.5)
lim
n→∞
1
n
E(Cn) ≥ Re (weak secrecy condition). (2.6)
The weak secrecy rate-equivocation region of a DWTC is
RS , cl {(RS , Re) : (RS , Re) is achievable} , (2.7)
and the weak secrecy capacity of a DWTC is
CS , sup {RS : (RS , RS) ∈ Rs} . (2.8)
X
3Definition 3.1. in [BB11].
4Definition 3.2. in [BB11].
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This definition of the secrecy rate-equivocation pair provides only weak
secrecy, as the equivocation is considered as a rate, i.e., the eavesdropper
gets no information in average, but maybe single bits.
A stronger notion of secrecy is given in the following definition.
(2.5) Definition (Strong Secrecy5).
A strong secrecy rate-equivocation pair (RS , Re) is achievable for the
DWTC if there exists a sequence of (2nRS , n) codes {Cn}n≥1 such that
lim
n→∞Pe(Cn) = 0 (reliability condition), (2.9)
lim
n→∞
(E(Cn)− nRe) ≥ 0 (strong secrecy condition). (2.10)
The strong secrecy rate-equivocation region of a DWTC is
R¯S , cl {(RS , Re) : (RS , Re) is achievable} , (2.11)
and the strong secrecy capacity of a DWTC is
C¯S , sup {RS : (RS , RS) ∈ Rs} . (2.12)
X
For the discrete memoryless DWTC it was proved in [MW00] that the
strong secrecy capacity equals the weak secrecy capacity. Throughout
this thesis, all system models will be analyzed for weak secrecy according
to Definition (2.4).
(2.6) Corollary (Secrecy Capacity of the Discrete Memoryless DWTC6).
The secrecy capacity for the discrete memoryless DWTC is given by
CS = max
pX
I(X;Y |Z) = max
pX
(I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)) . (2.13)
X
Unfortunately, it is not an easy task to find the probability density func-
tion at the input that maximizes the difference of the two mutual infor-
mation expressions. Although the mutual information is concave in pX ,
this does not apply necessarily to the difference of two expressions.
5Defintion 3.3. in [BB11].
6The secrecy capacity was first established in Theorem 3 in [Wyn75].
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Therefore, we apply a lower bound, which is easier to compute and
therefore often used.
CS = max
pX
(I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)) (2.14)
≥ max
pX
I(X;Y )−max
pX
I(X;Z) (2.15)
= CM − CE (2.16)
= RS (2.17)
The extension to the Gaussian case was done by Leung-Yan-Cheong
and Hellman in [LH78]. We further extend this model to the complex
Gaussian case. Here, the main channel h and the wiretap channel g
are both complex Gaussian distributed channels with zero mean and
variance 1 and independent of each other. Further, the additive white
Gaussian noise terms are denoted by nB and nE and are distributed
with zero mean and variance σ2B and σ
2
E , respectively, and indepen-
dent of each other. The transmitter Alice encodes the message m and
sends the resulting codeword x in n channel uses with power constraint
1
n
∑n
i=1 |xi|2 = P . The secrecy rate for this scenario is given by
RS(P ) = CM − CE (2.18)
= log2 (1 + SNRB)− log2 (1 + SNRE) (2.19)
= log2
(
1 +
|h|2 P
σB
)
− log2
(
1 +
|g|2 P
σB + σE
)
. (2.20)
Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman also proved that the achievable secrecy
rate RS , derived by the lower bound, is equal to the secrecy capacity
CS .
2.2 Non-Degraded Wiretap Channel
In the same year as Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman, Csiszár and Körner
analyzed in [CK78] the broadcast channel with confidential messages.
The transmitter wants to send a common message to both, Bob and Eve,
and a confidential message only to Bob. A special case of this system
model is the non-degraded WTC, where only the confidential message
is sent.
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Alice main channel Bob
Evewiretap channel
X Y
Z
Figure 2.2: The non-degraded WTC.
In the broadcast channel, the main channel is not necessarily better than
the wiretap channel. Therefore, the secrecy rate is not always positive
and the secrecy capacity for the non-degraded WTC can be expressed
as
CS =
[
max
px
(I(X;Y )− I(X;Z))
]+
, (2.21)
where [·]+ is the maximization function max(·, 0). This system model
corresponds much better to the wireless scenario than the DWTC.
Due to the maximization function, the transmitter only sends her mes-
sage, if the main channel is advantageous. Otherwise, Alice will not
transmit anything. This result, which is due to the fact that the Channel
State Information (CSI) are fixed and therefore, the secrecy rate will
not vary, is quite frustrating. This disadvantage can be overcome by
additional degrees of freedom in the communication system, e.g., fad-
ing channel states and multiple antennas, as discussed in the following
sections.
2.3 Fading Wiretap Channel
Wireless channels are in general subject to fading processes, i.e., the
CSI values of the channels vary over the time. This means, that in the
above channel model the channel coefficients h and g become random
variables. These random variables change from time unit to time unit
and are independent of each other and identically distributed.
In the literature, the fading behavior is often distinguished between slow
and fast fading. There are different definitions for these terms available.
Within this thesis, we will follow the definition of [TV08].
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(2.7) Definition (Slow Fading).
The channel is a slow fading channel, if the coherence time is longer
than the delay requirement of the application. X
This definition of a slow fading channel means that the channel states
are random but remain constant for a sufficiently long time to transmit a
whole codeword. The secrecy rate can be calculated for every time unit
and is called instantaneous secrecy rate. A special case of slow fading is
the quasi-static block-flat fading channel. Here, the channel states are
constant over a complete block of transmission but vary independently
from block to block.
(2.8) Definition (Fast Fading).
The channel is a fast fading channel, if the coherence time is much shorter
than the delay requirement of the application. X
If the channel is in fast fading, a single codeword needs to be transmitted
over several channel states. Therefore, the secrecy rate can only be
calculated in average.
(2.9) Remark.
Both definitions do not only take the environment of the channel into
account but also the application that the channel is used for. This is done
by the delay requirement, which is different for every application, e.g.,
voice applications do typically have a short delay requirement of less
than 100 ms and the tactile internet even less than 10 ms. X
As the channel states vary over time, there are always some realizations
where the achievable secrecy rate is positive.
2.4 The Multiple-Input Single-Output Wiretap Channel
Multi-antenna systems have been an import research area for more than
ten years. They offer high-data transmission and increased reliability for
wireless communication [Gol+03].
In the area of information-theoretic secrecy, the increased number of
degrees of freedom provided by the additional antennas are used to in-
crease the secrecy by means of diversity. In [SU07] and [SLU09], the Gaus-
sian Multiple-Input Single-Output (MISO) and Multiple-Input Multiple-
Output (MIMO) WTC with a single antenna at the eavesdropper are
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discussed and both provide the result that single-stream beamforming
is optimal with regard to throughput. The fading MISO WTC, where the
eavesdropper is also equipped with multiple antennas, is investigated
in [KW10a]. In [KW10b], this analysis is extended to the MIMO case.
Therein, the authors study two special cases: perfect channel knowledge
and no channel knowledge of the channel to the eavesdropper.
Within this thesis, we focus in Part II on the non-degraded fading WTC
with multiple antennas at the transmitter. In contrast to the previously
introduced Single-Input Single-Output (SISO) WTC, the transmitter has
nT antennas in order to transmit her message. Therefore, the channels
h and g to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively,
are vector channels, where the single components might be spatially
correlated. Due to the vector channel, Alice can now apply a Beamform-
ing Vector (BV) w with a sum power constraint of ‖w‖2 = 1 in order to
optimize the power allocation per channel component and therewith
also control the direction of the transmission.
Alice
h
main channel
X
nB
Bob
Eve
nEg
wiretap channel
Y
Z
Figure 2.3: System model of the MISO non-degraded WTC with additive
noise.
Let us assume quasi-static block-flat fading for the vector channels h
between Alice and Bob and g between Alice and Eve. The channel model
depicted in Figure 2.3 can be written as
y = hHwx+ nB and z = gHwx+ nE , (2.22)
where x ∈ X is the complex channel input, y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z are the
complex channel outputs at Bob and Eve, respectively. The channel
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vectors h and g are random zero-mean complex Gaussian distributed
vectors with covariance matrix I . The BV is given byw, whose elements
are complex values. The scalars nB and nE denote the white Gaussian
noise at the receivers and are independent and identically distributed
circular symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero-mean
and variance σ2. The inverse noise power 1/σ2 is denoted by ρ.
For such a MISO WTC, the instantaneous secrecy rate is computed in
[SU07] and given by
RS =
[
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2)− log2 (1 + ρ ∣∣gHw∣∣2)]+ . (2.23)
The optimal beamforming strategy to achieve the secrecy capacity of the
MISO channel was derived by [SU07] and is given in the next Theorem.
(2.10) Theorem (Optimal Beamforming Strategy for the MISO WTC7).
The optimal Beamforming Vector w with transmit power constraint ‖w‖2 = 1
is given by
w = ψ, (2.24)
where ψ is the generalized eigenvector that belongs to the maximum generalized
eigenvalue νmax of the matrix pencil
(I + ρhhH, I + ρggH). X
This secrecy capacity is only achievable if Alice has full CSI on the
channels h and g to Bob and Eve respectively. Such an assumption
might be reasonable, when Eve is part of the communication system. We
will discuss in Part II the case, where Alice has only partial CSI on the
channel g to the eavesdropper.
2.5 The Relay Wiretap Channel
Another channel model, which is often discussed in literature, is the
relay WTC.
7This result was derived in [SU07, Section III].
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Alice
Relay
Eve
Bob
hR
hB
hE dE
dR
(a) Phase I
Alice
Relay
Eve
Bob
gE
gB
hE
hB
(b) Phase II
Figure 2.4: System model of a SISO relay WTC.
Here, the transmitter Alice wants to send a confidential message to
the intended receiver Bob with the aid of a trustworthy relay, which
operates in half-duplex mode, i.e., it can either receive or transmit a
message. Thus, the communication from Alice to Bob is done in two
phases, as depicted in Figure 2.4. Unfortunately, the eavesdropper Eve
is able to overhear not only the first phase, where Alice communicates
her message to the relay and Bob, but also the second phase, where the
relay forwards the message to Bob. Therefore, Eve gets information on
the sent message from two communication phases.
Additionally, Alice and Bob have the possibility to protect the two com-
munication phases by transmitting a protection signal xn over the chan-
nels hE and dE , which are illustrated in orange in Figure 2.4. Such a
protection signal may be Artificial Noise (AN) (see Section 4.1). Never-
theless, they need to take care not to disturb the legitimate receivers too
much over the channels dR and hB .
For the calculation of the achievable secrecy rate, it is important in which
forwarding mode the relay operates. Nowadays, the following modes
are frequently discussed in literature [KMY06].
• Amplify-and-Forward (AF): This is the most simple mode. The
receive signal is only amplified, before it is further transmitted to
the intended receiver. Therefore, the noise term of the transmission
from Alice to the relay is also amplified and forwarded. Addition-
ally, the relay does not learn the original message, as no decoding
is done.
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• Decode-and-Forward (DF): The relay first decodes the signal, i.e.,
the noise is removed from the receive signal, and than forwards
the signal to Bob. This mode has the advantage that Bob gets a less
noisy receive signal at the end. Unfortunately, the same applies
to Eve. Additionally, the relay also gets aware of the decoded
message.
• Compress-and-Forward (CF): In this mode, the relay compresses
the receive signal without decoding and sends the quantized ver-
sion to the destination. The relay is, similar to the AF mode, igno-
rant of the message send by the transmitter.
One of the first papers on secrecy in relay WTCs is [LE08]. Here, the
authors analyze the impact of DF and CF operation modes at the relay on
the achievable secrecy rate in a SISO relay WTC. Additionally, the results
are compared to the case where the relay only functions as a helper and
sends AN. In [GTS11a] and [GTS11b], the relay operation modes AF and
DF as well as the AN strategy are further analyzed with regard to the
outage performance (see Section 3.2) and optimal power allocation in
the Rayleigh slow fading case, if the channels to the eavesdropper are
known only statistically.
The extension to the relay network with multiple relays and multiple
eavesdroppers is done in [Don+10]. In this paper, the authors derive an
optimal power allocation for maximizing the secrecy rate under a global
power constraint in the SISO relay WTC with full CSI on all channels.
A slightly modified version of the relay WTC is the two-hop relay WTC,
where no direct link hB between transmitter and receiver is available.
Therefore, the communication needs to go over the relay. Further, it
is not possible anymore, that the relay functions as an external helper,
which only sends AN signals in order to disturb the eavesdropper.
The maximization of the achievable secrecy rates in such a SISO two-
hop relay WTC is investigated in [DYJ11]. In this paper, the relay is
working in DF operation mode and the source and the relay are sending
additionally AN signals, which are known a priori by the relay and the
destination. Therefore, this transmission scheme equals a cryptographic
encryption, as the AN signal is functioning as a key, which has to be
exchanged securely before transmission. An optimal power allocation at
source and relay is derived for the two cases of full CSI and partial CSI
on the channels to Eve.
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The achievable secrecy rates in the MIMO two-hop relay WTC, where
every node has multiple antennas, are determined in [HS11]. The relay
applies the DF operation mode. The authors proposed the idea, that Bob
may send AN during the first phase in order to confuse Eve. Addition-
ally, Alice splits her power to send the data signal and an AN signal.
Further, the authors analyze the case of full CSI as well as the case of
partial CSI on the channels to the eavesdropper.
In Part III, we investigate the two-hop relay WTC, based on the non-
degraded MISO Gaussian WTC, which is introduced in Section 2.4.
Alice and Bob have nT and nD antennas, respectively, while the relay
and Eve have only single antenna each. Therefore, all channels, except
gE , are vector channels. Further, the relay operates in AF mode. We
assume individual power constraints at the transmit nodes denoted by
pS,1 ≤ PS,1 (first phase), pS,2 ≤ PS,2 (second phase) at the source Alice
and pR ≤ PR at the relay (second phase). Bob is not transmitting in
this channel model, i.e., the channels dR and dE in the first phase are
nonexistent.
The channels are named according to Figure 2.4, where the direct link
between Alice and Bob is not available. The vectorswS,1 andwS,2 are the
BVs at Alice in the first and second communication phase, respectively.
The receive beamforming vector at the intended receiver Bob in the
second phase is given by wB . The received signals at the relay and the
eavesdropper in the first phase are given by
yR = h
H
RwS,1x+ nR and
yE,1 = h
H
EwS,1x+ nE,1,
respectively. Accordingly, the received signals in the second phase at the
destination and the eavesdropper are given by
yB =
√
αwHBgB(h
H
RwS,1x+ nR) + nB and
yE,2 = h
H
EwS,2xn +
√
αgE(h
H
RwS,1x+ nR) + nE,2.
The scalars nB , nR, nE,1, and nE,2 are additive white complex Gaussian
noise with zero mean and variance σ2 at the intended receiver Bob, the
relay and the eavesdropper in the first and second phase, respectively.
The scalar xn is a signal sent by the source in order to protect the main
signal x. The scaling factor α, which satisfies the power constraint at the
2.5 The Relay Wiretap Channel 17
relay, is derived by
α ≤ |xR|
2
|yR|2
,
where xR is the forwarded signal at the relay.
An achievable secrecy rate RS for the Gaussian two-hop relay WTC with
multiple antennas at the transmitter and the receiver is then given by
RS = [C(ΓB)− C(ΓE)]+ , where
ΓB =
αρpS,1
∣∣wHBgB∣∣2 ∣∣∣hHRwS,1∣∣∣2
α
∣∣wHBgB∣∣2 + 1 ,
ΓE = ρpS,1
∣∣∣hHEwS,1∣∣∣2 + αρpS,1 |gE |2
∣∣∣hHRwS,1∣∣∣2
ρpS,2
∣∣∣hHEwS,2∣∣∣2 + α |gE |2 + 1 , and
α =
ρpR
ρpS,1
∣∣∣hHRwS,1∣∣∣2 + 1 .
C(SINR) is the Gaussian rate expression given by C(SINR) = log2(1 +
SINR). The inverse noise power is denoted by ρ = 1/σ2.
In Part III, a novel protection mechanism for the above channel model is
introduced, where for the case of full CSI the information leakage to the
eavesdropper can be completely neutralized. Further, this Information
Leakage Neutralization (IN) scheme is compared to AN and several
beamforming schemes without further protection mechanisms. The case
of partial CSI on the channel gE from the relay to the eavesdropper is
also analyzed.
3 Influence of Partial Channel State
Information on Secrecy Rates
The assumption of perfect channel knowledge is widely used for the
calculation of secrecy capacities and secrecy rates and might be reason-
able if the eavesdropper Eve is part of the communication system. For
example in [JM09], a MISO interference channel with confidential mes-
sages is studied under the assumption that the receivers are legitimated
to receive the message sent to them but eavesdrop the message intended
for the second receiver. However, if the eavesdropper is not a regular
user of the communication system this assumption is unreasonable and
the transmitter has therefore only partial channel knowledge, given by
estimation or prediction, or even no Channel State Information (CSI)
of the channel to the eavesdropper. In [MS11], the impact of imprecise
channel estimates of both the channels to the intended receiver and the
eavesdropper in the WTC is analyzed. In [LM11], the case of imper-
fect CSI on the channels to the intended receiver and the eavesdropper,
where the uncertainty is modeled by a deterministic model, was investi-
gated. In [Lin+11], the authors investigate the influence of AN on the
secrecy rate of the WTC with quantized feedback on the main channel
and no CSI on the eavesdropper’s channel.
In the following, we present certain performance measures, which take
the channel uncertainty on the wiretap channel into account. A short
overview of this topic is also available in [LPS10]. The right choice
of the performance measure depends mainly on the channel statistics
(following the definition from [TV08]): The ergodic secrecy rate is the
right measure for the fast fading scenario while the secrecy outage rate
fits the slow fading scenario.
3.1 Ergodic Secrecy Rate
If the channel experiences fast fading (see Section 2.3), the secrecy of
the communication is measured in terms of the ergodic secrecy rate as
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described in [SU07, Section IV].
(3.1) Definition (Ergodic Secrecy Rate).
The ergodic secrecy rate is defined as
RS =
[
Eh
[
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2)]− Eg[log2 (1 + ρ ∣∣gHw∣∣2)]]+ , (3.1)
i.e., the expectation is taken over the achievable secrecy rate with respect
to the random channels. The power is constrained via the BV w to
‖w‖2 = P and P being the available power at the transmitter. X
Please note that in Definition (3.1) the expectation in the first term is
taken with respect to h. As Alice knows h perfectly, the BV w can be
chosen for each channel realization. The second term of Definition (3.1)
is with respect to g, which is only statistically known. The ergodic
secrecy rate simplifies to
RS =
[
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2)− Eg[log2 (1 + ρ ∣∣gHw∣∣2)]]+ . (3.2)
During the last years, the ergodic secrecy rate was investigated for dif-
ferent channel models. The authors of [EU09] investigated the parallel
broadcast channel, where both receivers try to eavesdrop each other. In
[LPS08], the broadcast channel with public and confidential messages
was analyzed. Here, only one receiver shall be able to decode the confi-
dential message, but both receivers need to be able to decode the public
message. For both models, the ergodic secrecy rate for the case of full
CSI under fast fading was studied.
The assumption of full CSI on all channels was relaxed in [Lin+13]. In
this work, the authors examine the fast fading MISO WTC with statistical
CSI at the transmitter for the channel to the eavesdropper. An achievable
ergodic secrecy rate is derived under usage of AN signals, which are
not restricted to the null space of the intended receiver. In [LL14], the
MIMO fast fading Rayleigh WTC with a multiple-antenna eavesdropper
and statistical CSI to both Bob and Eve is under research. For the case
of sum power constraint at the transmitter, the ergodic secrecy capacity
was found. A more general approach to find the ergodic secrecy capacity
in the SISO WTC was studied in [LJ14], where the authors characterize
the relation between the ergodic secrecy capacity of fast fading wiretap
channels and the stochastic orders.
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3.2 Secrecy Outage Probability
In delay-critical applications, the issue of outage events is of big impor-
tance. In [PB05], the authors investigate the slow fading (see Section 2.3)
Single-Input Multiple-Output (SIMO) WTC with full CSI and discuss
the occurrence of outage events due to the fading nature of the channels.
In [BR06], the secrecy outage probability was first defined for the SISO
WTC under Rayleigh fading and an average power constraint, where
only the main channel CSI is known. The authors showed that the fading
nature of the wireless channel provides a positive secrecy rate in average,
even if the eavesdropper has an advantage regarding the signal-to-noise
ratio. In [Blo+08], the authors extended this model to the case where a
disturbed version of the eavesdropper’s CSI is available. In [LPS08], the
optimal power allocation scheme for the SISO fading broadcast channel
with full CSI has been investigated, when the transmitter has to fulfill
rate requirements.
(3.2) Definition (Secrecy Outage Probability).
The secrecy outage probability is defined as
PR(E) = ,
where E is an outage event. The secrecy outage probability describes
the probability that a data packet cannot be transmitted securely to the
intended receiver in the next block. X
For the secrecy outage event, there are different definitions used. The
one more often used is defined in [BR06] and given as
E1 = {RS < RS} . (3.3)
Therein, RS is the achievable secrecy rate of the system model, which is
investigated, andRS is a given target secrecy rate, which can be achieved
by usage of a secure code. The outage event E1 contains two different
types of outages. Due to the fading nature of the channels, we have an
outage every time when the channel to Eve is better than the channel
to Bob, i.e., the main channel has no advantage over the channel to the
eavesdropper. For the case of full CSI, we know exactly when this event
occurs and set the rate to zero to prevent security breaches. Therefore,
we treat this kind of outage not as a secrecy outage. The second kind
of outage occurs due to the estimation errors on the channel to Eve
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when the CSI is only partially known. In this case, perfect secrecy is not
always given and a security breach cannot be prevented with absolute
certainty.
A definition of the secrecy outage event, that states these different outage
events more explicitly is given in [Gun+13]. The transmitter wants to
send data with target secrecy rate RS , which again can be achieved by
usage of a secure code. Additionally, Alice transmits with a rate equal
to the difference between the achievable secrecy rate RS and the used
target secrecy rate RS randomly generated key bits, which can be used
to encrypt the data stream, when the achievable secrecy rate is lower
than the target secrecy rate. The secrecy outage event is then given by
E2 =
{
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2) < RS} ∪{ 1nH(W |Z(N)) < RS − 0
}
,
(3.4)
where the first part is the usual outage event, i.e., when the reliability
condition in Equation (2.5) is not fulfilled, which also occurs in fading
channels without secrecy constraints and the second part models the
secrecy outage event that occurs when the secrecy constraint in Equa-
tion (2.6) is not fulfilled. In the case where the main channel to Bob
is perfectly known to Alice, the first term gets zero by an appropriate
choice of the BV w.
In [YE11], the authors define the secrecy outage event [YE11, eq. (7)]
as
E3 =
{
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣gHw∣∣2) > RT −RS} (3.5)
with fixed source transmission rate RT and the main channel decoding
error event [YE11, eq. 8] is defined as
E4 =
{
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2) < RT} . (3.6)
The difference between Equation (3.5) and Equation (3.3) is the assump-
tion of channel knowledge on the channel h between Alice and Bob. If h
is fully known at the transmitter, Alice chooses RT = log2(1 + ρ|hHw|2)
and from Equation (3.5) follows Equation (3.3). The difference between
Equation (3.6) and Equation (3.4) is the definition of the main chan-
nel outage event. In Equation (3.6), the intended receiver decodes at
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the source transmission rate RT whereas in Equation (3.4) the receiver
decodes at secrecy rate RS .
For the analysis in Part II, we use the secrecy outage event in Equa-
tion (3.3).
3.3 Robust Secrecy Rate
A third performance measure, which takes the channel uncertainty into
account, is the robust secrecy rate, which is an achievable secrecy rate
calculated over the worst case eavesdropper out of a set of possible
eavesdropper channel states or positions. Often, this is done with the
help of the compound wiretap channel, which is a generalization of the
WTC, where every channel from the transmitter to the eavesdropper has
a number of states. More details on the compound wiretap channel and
the robust secrecy rate can be found in [LPS10] and references therein.
An achievable worst case secrecy rate in a MISO WTC with k possible
states for the eavesdropper channel is given by
RS = max min
k
[
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2)− log2 (1 + ρ ∣∣gHkw∣∣2)]+ .
The authors of [LM11] investigated the robust secrecy rate in the MISO
WTC with multiple eavesdroppers, which are each equipped with multi-
ple antennas. The transmitter has only partial channel knowledge to the
intended receiver and the eavesdropper, which is modeled as spherical
CSI uncertainty. In [WJ10a], the MIMO WTC, where all parties have
multiple antennas, was studied. The CSI to Eve was unknown to the
transmitter, but it was known, that the logical location of the eaves-
dropper is drawn from a certain set. The worst case secrecy rate was
maximized for this scenario and upper and lower bounds on the worst
case secrecy capacity under a sum power constraint at the transmitter
derived.
4 Protection Mechanisms
The previously introduced secrecy rates can be further optimized. For
this purpose, it is sometimes useful to apply an additional protection
mechanism in order to transmit the confidential message securely to
the intended receiver. Nowadays, the most used protection mechanism
in literature is Artificial Noise (AN), which is described in Section 4.1.
A novel approach in relay networks is given by Information Leakage
Neutralization (IN), which is introduced in Section 4.2.
4.1 Artificial Noise
In [NG05], the authors first proposed the idea to utilize Artificial Noise
(AN), some Gaussian random signal, in order to generate additional
interference at the eavesdropper. In their paper, the authors split the
power at the transmitter, who is equipped with multiple antennas, into
one part to transmit the actual data stream and a second part for the AN
signal. By transmitting the artificial noise in the null space, i.e., hHW = 0
in the channel model of Section 2.4, whereW is the transmit covariance
matrix of the AN signal, additional interference at the legitimate receiver
Bob is avoided. Therefore, the transmission rate to Bob is unchanged
while the eavesdropper’s rate is decreased.
(4.1) Definition (Achievable Secrecy Rate with Artificial Noise).
An achievable secrecy rate RS for the MISO WTC, where the transmitter
splits the transmit power in order to send a data stream and an AN
signal, is given by
RS =
[
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2)− log2(1 + ρ ∣∣gHw∣∣2
1 + ρ ‖gHW ‖2
)]+
,
where the AN signal is send in the null space of the intended receiver,
i.e., hHW = 0. The transmit power at Alice is constraint to ‖w‖2 = φ
and trace (WW ) = (1− φ). X
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The AN protection mechanism, sometimes also called friendly or coop-
erative jamming, has been applied to several system models. In [MS09],
the authors extended the results of [NG05] to the MIMO multi receiver
scenario, where they investigated the broadcast as well as the multi-
cast channel with a single eavesdropper, whose CSI is unknown to the
transmitter. For the data streams, SINR requirements have to be fulfilled,
while the remainder of the transmit power is used to transmit AN signals
in the null space of all receivers. The optimal power allocation strategy
in a MISO system with multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers, which
are jammed by AN, was investigated in [ZM09].
In [Tan+08], the authors analyzed the WTC with a helping interferer,
who is only sending AN signals, while the transmitter can use the com-
plete transmit power to send the confidential message to the receiver.
Additionally, the authors propose the idea to use random Gaussian code
words at the helper, so that the legitimate receiver can decode the inter-
ference, while the eavesdropper is not able to do so. The case, where
the helper has multiple antennas was studied in [Don+09]. In [WJ10b],
the optimality of Zero Forcing (ZF) in the MISO WTC with a helping
interferer, which has multiple antennas, was analyzed. Further, AN was
also applied to relay WTCs, as already mentioned in Section 2.5.
More detailed information on the function of AN can be found in [BB11,
Chapter 8] and an overview of different system models with AN is
provided in [HY10].
4.2 Information Leakage Neutralization
For the two-hop relay WTC as described in Section 2.5, another approach
which aims on the protection of the data signal is possible. This approach
is based on interference neutralization, which is a technique to cancel
interference or a signal at a specific receiver, under the condition that
the signal has to travel over a relay. This technique was applied to deter-
ministic interference relay networks [Moh+08], two-hop relay channels
[Ber+09], and to instantaneous relay networks [HJ12]. If applied to se-
crecy rate scenarios, this protection mechanism is called Information
Leakage Neutralization (IN). This was done recently for the MISO Gaus-
sian two-hop relay WTC with full CSI [Ger+12] as well as partial CSI
[EHJ13] on the channel between the relay and the eavesdropper as well
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as for instantaneous relay networks [HJE13; HJG13], where the other
users of the system are the eavesdroppers.
If the transmitter has full channel state information of all channels in the
system, Alice can construct a signal xn, that fulfills
−√αgEhHRwS,1x = hHEwS,2xn
⇒ xn = −
√
αgEh
H
RwS,1
hHEwS,2
x.
By sending this signal xn during the second transmission phase, the
transmitter can neutralize the eavesdropped signal at Eve that she re-
ceives over the relay in the second phase.
In order to successfully neutralize the relayed signal during the second
phase, an additional power constraint for the transmission of the IN
signal has to be fulfilled.
(4.2) Definition (IN power constraint).
The power allocated for the IN signal has to fulfill
Ex
[
|xn|2
]
=
αpS,1 |gE |2
∣∣∣hHRwS,1∣∣∣2∣∣∣hHEwS,2∣∣∣2 ≤ pS,2
where α = ρpR
ρpS,1|hHRwS,1|2+1 . X
(4.3) Remark.
If Alice applies ZF with respect to Eve during the first phase, the IN
protection scheme implies that Eve gets no data signal at all. Therefore,
Alice can perform conventional channel coding instead of the more
complex secrecy binning that is normally used for wiretap systems. X
5 High-SNR Slope and High-SNR Power
Offset
In order to compare different transmission and protection schemes in
the high-Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) regime, we use the concept of the
high-SNR power offset introduced in [LTV05]. The achievable rate as a
function of the SNR ρ = 1/σ2 is denoted by R(ρ).
(5.1) Definition (High-SNR slope).
The high-SNR slope is defined as
S∞ = lim
ρ→∞
R(ρ)
log2(ρ)
in bits/s/Hz/(3 dB). X
(5.2) Definition (High-SNR power offset).
The high-SNR power offset is given as
L∞ = lim
ρ→∞
(
log2(ρ)− R(ρ)S∞
)
in 3 dB units. X
In the high-SNR regime, the throughput behaves like
R(ρ) = S∞
(
ρ[dB]
3[dB]
− L∞
)
+O(1).
For more detailed insights, see [LTV05, Section II].
The high-SNR power offset is useful in order to compare two systems
with the same high-SNR slope S∞ with regard to there shifted through-
put curves at high-SNR.
PART II
BEAMFORMING AND PROTECTION
STRATEGIES FOR WIRETAP CHANNELS
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Figure 6.1: System model of the MISO non-degraded WTC with additive
noise.
The system considered in this chapter is based on the MISO Gaussian
WTC presented in Section 2.4. The transmitter, Alice, has nT antennas,
while the receiver, Bob, and the eavesdropper, Eve, have only single
antenna each.
As before, denote the quasi-static block-flat fading vector channel be-
tween Alice and Bob as h and between Alice and Eve as g. The signal
model depicted in Figure 6.1 can be written as
y = hHwx+ nB and z = gHwx+ nE , (6.1)
where x ∈ X is the complex channel input, y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z are the
complex channel outputs at Bob and Eve, respectively. The channel
vectors h and g are zero-mean complex Gaussian distributed random
vectors with covariance matrix I . The BV is given byw, whose elements
are complex values. The scalars nB and nE denote the white Gaussian
noise at the receivers and are independent and identically distributed
circular symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero-mean
and variance σ2. The inverse noise power 1/σ2 is denoted by ρ.
Alice has full CSI to Bob, but only partial CSI to Eve. The CSI on g could
for example be outdated, a sophisticated guess, or even completely
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unknown to Alice. Therefore, an appropriate model for the channel
vector g should take these cases into account.
(6.1) Definition.
The uncertainty at Alice on the channel g is modeled as
g =
√
κ d+
√
1− κ g˜, (6.2)
where d is the known deterministic component of the channel between
Alice and Eve and g˜ is a random zero-mean circular symmetric com-
plex valued Gaussian vector with covariance matrix I . The scalar κ in
Equation (6.2) indicates the degree of knowledge Alice has about the
channel g to Eve1, i.e., for κ = 1, Alice has full CSI about the channel to
Eve, while κ = 0 represents the case, where Alice has no CSI about the
wiretap channel and g = g˜. X
(6.2) Remark.
For the case of full CSI, we have κ = 1. Therefore, the MISO wiretap
channel in Equation (6.2) reduces to g = d and the result on the optimal
beamforming strategy presented in Theorem (2.10) applies.
This result is taken as an upper bound for all beamforming and protec-
tion strategies discussed in this part. X
For data transmission, the transmitter performs single-stream beamform-
ing, where we define following BVs.
(6.3) Definition (Beamforming Directions).
The transmitter allocates her power such that the data stream is send in
a certain direction [TV08]. These Beamforming Vectors (BVs) are given
by
wMRT =
h
‖h‖ , wZF =
Π⊥dh
‖Π⊥dh‖
, w⊥ZF =
Πdh
‖Πdh‖ ,
and wLBF(τ) =
√
τw⊥ZF +
√
1− τwZF. (6.3)
The vector wMRT is the Maximum Ratio Transmission (MRT) BV in
the direction of h, the vector wZF is the ZF BV in the direction of the
1In channel modeling, this scenario corresponds to a fading channel with Line-of-Sight
(LOS) component and κ = K/1+K where K is the K-factor.
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Figure 6.2: Graphical interpretation of BVs in 2D.
projection of h onto the null space of d, and the vector w⊥ZF is the vector
in the direction of the projection of h onto d. The vectorwLBF(τ) denotes
the linear combination between the BVs wZF and w⊥ZF, where τ ∈ [0, 1]
has to be chosen appropriately. X
(6.4) Remark.
An alternative parameterization for the beamformer wLBF(τ) in Equa-
tion (6.3) is given by
wLBF(λ) =
λ wMRT + (1− λ) wZF
‖λ wMRT + (1− λ) wZF‖ . (6.4)
The mapping from τ ∈ [0, 1] in Equation (6.3) to λ ∈ [0, 1] in Equa-
tion (6.4) is derived in the proof of Corollary 2 in [JLD08] and is given
by
wLBF(τ) =
(√
τ
`1 + `2
`1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ
‖λwMRT+(1−λ)wZF‖
wMRT +
(
√
1− τ −
√
τ
`2
`1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−λ
‖λwMRT+(1−λ)wZF‖
wZF
with `1 = ‖Πdh‖2 and `2 = ‖Π⊥d h‖2.
This parameterization has the advantage that the beamformerwLBF(λ)
can be found over a smaller set of BVs, i.e., wLBF(λ) varies between wZF
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andwMRT, whilewLBF(τ) goes fromwZF tow⊥ZF. The two sets of BVs are
equivalent, if τ ∈ [0, τMRT] with τMRT = ‖Πdh‖2/‖h‖2. X
Figure 6.2 shows the BVs wMRT (red vector), wZF and w⊥ZF (blue vectors)
given in Definition (6.3) as well as the two parameterizations of wLBF(τ)
and wLBF(λ) for a two-dimensional vector space. It can be seen that the
λ-parameterization (green solid angle) covers a smaller set of BVs than
the τ -parameterization (green dashed angle), as mentioned before.
7 Beamforming with Partial Channel State
Information
In this chapter, we characterize the optimal transmit strategy with partial
CSI at Alice (h and d perfectly known at Alice) as specified in Defini-
tion (6.1). As performance measures, we use the ergodic secrecy rate, as
introduced in Section 3.1, and the secrecy outage probability, described
in Section 3.2.
We distinguish between optimal beamforming strategies, where Alice
performs single-stream beamforming and transmits the intended signal
with full transmit power, and protection mechanisms, where Alice splits
her transmit power in order to protect the message additionally (see
Chapter 4).
Within this chapter, we present results that were previously published
on international conferences or in IEEE journals. The results on the
ergodic secrecy rate presented in Sections 7.1.1 and 7.2.1 were pub-
lished in [GWJ10]. Furthermore, the results on the optimal beamforming
strategies for the performance measure of the secrecy outage probability
provided in Section 7.1.2 were first presented in [GSJ11] and later comple-
mented by the protection strategies given in Section 7.2.2 in [GSJ12].
7.1 Optimal Beamforming Strategies
First, let us analyze the optimal beamforming strategies if Alice only
transmits her data without any kind of protection mechanism. As al-
ready described above, Alice performs single-stream beamforming in
order to transmit her signal to the intended receiver Bob. As the wiretap
channel is only partially known, the result from Section 2.4 cannot be
applied.
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7.1.1 Ergodic Secrecy Rate
In fast fading environments, the chosen performance measure is the
ergodic secrecy rate (see Section 3.1).
(7.1) Definition (Ergodic Secrecy Rate).
The ergodic secrecy rate for the MISO wiretap channel with full CSI
on the channel h to the intended receiver Bob and partial CSI on the
channel g to the eavesdropper, as specified in Definition (6.1), is given
by
RS(w) =
[
Eh
[
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2)]− Eg[log2 (1 + ρ ∣∣gHw∣∣2)]]+ .
Note that the expectation in the first term is with respect to h. However,
the BV w can be chosen for each realization of h since Alice knows the
channel h perfectly. Therefore, the ergodic secrecy rate reduces to
RS(w) =
[
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2)− Eg[log2 (1 + ρ ∣∣gHw∣∣2)]]+ . X
(7.2) Optimization Problem.
Alice transmits the intended signal with full transmit power. This corre-
sponds to the programming problem
max
w:‖w‖2=1
RS(w). X
(7.3) Proposition.
Let τ ∈ [0, 1]. The optimal Beamforming Vector w solving the Optimiza-
tion Problem (7.2) is given by wLBF(τ) in Equation (6.3).
The resulting secrecy rate is given by
RS(τ) =
[
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHwLBF(τ)∣∣∣2)
− Eg
[
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣gHwLBF(τ)∣∣2)] ]2. (7.1)
X
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Therefore, the Optimization Problem (7.2) reduces to an optimization
problem over the real valued parameter τ .
Proof.
In the proof, we show that wLBF(τ) in Equation (6.3) achieves the maxi-
mum of the Optimization Problem (7.2) for certain τ ∈ [0, 1].
We treat the ergodic secrecy rate RS in Definition (7.1) as a function of
the BV. We regard a BV
v˜(γ1, γ2, γ3, . . . , γnT ) = γ1w
⊥
ZF + γ2wZF +
nT∑
l=3
γlul (7.2)
with ‖v˜‖2 = 1 and an orthonormal basis {u3, . . . ,unT } that spans the
orthogonal complement of span{w⊥ZF,wZF} in CnT . Furthermore, all
γ = [γ1, . . . , γnT ] in Equation (7.2) are complex and
∑nT
l=1 |γl|2 = 1.
The power allocated to other directions than w⊥ZF and wZF has no im-
pact on |hHv˜|2, i.e., cannot improve the channel capacity from Alice to
Bob, as the receiver Bob is on the plane span{w⊥ZF,wZF} and all other
directions are orthogonal to this plane, as described above. Moreover,
allocating power to γ3, . . . , γnT in Equation (7.2) increases |gHv˜|2, and
hence decreases the secrecy rate, compared to the case where γi = 0 for
all i = 3, . . . , nT , except for the case when the eavesdropper is also on
the plane span{w⊥ZF,wZF}, where the value remains unchanged. Conse-
quently, the BV v(γ1, γ2, 0, . . . , 0) with ‖v‖2 ≤ ‖v˜‖2 achieves a higher or
equal secrecy rate than the BV v˜, i.e.,
RS(v˜) ≤ RS(v).
According to Lemma (A.1) in Appendix A, the secrecy rate RS increases
with increasing power allocated to the BV. Therefore, the following
relation holds
RS(v) ≤ RS(w)
for a normalized BV w = 1‖v‖v with ‖w‖2 = 1 ≥ ‖v‖2.
Thus, the maximization of the Optimization Problem (7.2) can only be
achieved by a BV of norm one that allocates power in the directions of
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w⊥ZF and wZF, i.e.,
w(
√
τeiϕ1 ,
√
1− τeiϕ2 , 0, . . . , 0)
= eiϕ1
(√
τ w⊥ZF +
√
1− τ ei(ϕ2−ϕ1)wZF
)
,
(7.3)
where the complex valued coefficients are written in their polar form
with τ, ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ R0+. Therewith, we found a parameterization for the
BV w similar to the one used in Equation (6.3), but with parameters that
are still complex valued. In the following, we show that it is sufficient to
use real valued parameters.
We observe that eiϕ1 in Equation (7.3) has no impact on |hHw|2 and
|gHw|2 in Optimization Problem (7.2). Consequently, we choose ϕ1 = 0.
Further, ϕ2 = 0 maximizes |hHw|2 while keeping the distribution of
|gHw|2 unchanged. Therefore, we set ϕ2 = 0 and obtain the parameteri-
zation in Equation (6.3). 
From Proposition (7.3), it can be seen that τ depends only on the SNR
ρ and the degree of channel knowledge on g, given by κ. Knowing
this, we can make three observations, which are given in the following
corollaries.
(7.4) Corollary (Beamforming without CSI).
For κ = 0, the optimal τ that maximizes the ergodic secrecy rateRS(τ) in
Equation (7.1) is given by τ = τMRT = ‖Πdh‖/‖h‖, i.e., MRT is optimal.X
Proof.
For the proof, we use the parameterization wLBF(λ), where the transfor-
mation from wLBF(τ) to wLBF(λ) is done according to Remark (6.4). It
holds ∣∣∣hHw(λ)∣∣∣2 = ∣∣∣∣∣λhHwMRT + (1− λ)hHwZF‖λwMRT + (1− λ)wZF‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣λhHwMRT‖λwMRT‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤
∣∣∣hHwMRT∣∣∣2
=
∣∣∣hHw(1)∣∣∣2
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for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, |gHw(λ)|2 is independent of w (and thus
of λ) for κ = 0.
For the parameterization wLBF(τ), this result corresponds to
τ∗ = τMRT =
‖Πdh‖2
‖h‖2 ,
which yields the MRT BV
w(τMRT) =
h
‖h‖ = wMRT. 
(7.5) Corollary (Beamforming with full CSI).
For κ = 1, the optimal τ that maximizes the ergodic secrecy rate RS(τ)
in Equation (7.1) is given by τ = τmax where
w(τmax) = ψ
with ψ given in Equation (2.24). X
Proof.
For κ = 1 holds g = d and the Optimization Problem (7.2) reduces to
max
w:‖w‖2=1
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2)− log2(1 + ρ ∣∣∣dHw∣∣∣2)
= max
w:‖w‖2=1
log2
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2
1 + ρ
∣∣∣dHw∣∣∣2

which has the same solution as
max
w:‖w‖2=1
wH
(
I + ρhhH
)
w
wH
(
I + ρddH
)
w
in Theorem (2.10). 
(7.6) Corollary (Beamforming for high SNR with full CSI).
For high SNR, i.e., ρ→∞, and κ = 1, the optimal τ , that maximizes the
ergodic secrecy rate RS(τ) in Equation (7.1), converges to zero, i.e., zero
forcing is used for transmission. X
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Proof.
For the proof, we use the high-SNR slope as defined in Chapter 5. We
optimize
max
w:‖w‖2=1
S∞(w)
= max
w:‖w‖2=1
lim
ρ→∞
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2)− log2 (1 + ρ ∣∣gHw∣∣2)
log2 (ρ)
. (7.4)
Note that in Equation (7.4) the high-SNR slope S∞(w) is one if and only
if |gHw|2 = 0 and zero otherwise. Therefore, for high SNR, we have to
choose τ = 0. 
7.1.2 Secrecy Outage Probability
For slow fading scenarios, the chosen measure is the secrecy outage
probability as presented in Section 3.2.
(7.7) Optimization Problem.
We optimize the transmit strategy such that the target secrecy rate RS
for a given secrecy outage probability  is maximized. This corresponds
to the programming problem
max
w:‖w‖2=1
RS s.t. Pr
log2 1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2
1 + ρ |gHw|2 < R

S
 = . (7.5)
According to Theorem (B.1) in Appendix B.1, there exists an equivalent
minimization problem for a fixed target secrecy rate RS , which is given
by
min
‖w‖2=1
 s.t.  = Pr
log2 1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2
1 + ρ |gHw|2 < R

S
 . (7.6)
Here, the purpose is to minimize the secrecy outage probability  for
a given target secrecy rate RS over all unit norm BVs w. Our further
investigations will concentrate on this problem. X
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(7.8) Proposition.
Let τ ∈ [0, 1]. Then the optimal Beamforming Vector w solving the
Optimization Problem (7.7) is given by wLBF(τ) in Equation (6.3).
The secrecy outage probability  can be expressed as
 = Q1

√
2κτ
1− κ‖d‖,
√√√√2− 2RS+1 + 2ρ ∣∣∣hHwLBF(τ)∣∣∣2
2R

Sρ(1− κ)
 , (7.7)
where Q1 denotes the Marcum Q-function of the first order. X
Therefore, the Optimization Problem (7.7) reduces to an optimization
problem over the real valued parameter τ .
Proof.
The proof consists of two steps. At first, we show that Equation (6.3)
achieves the maximum of the Optimization Problem (7.7) for certain
τ ∈ [0, 1]. This part of the proof follows the same lines as the proof of
Proposition (7.3). Afterwards, we derive the expression for the secrecy
outage probability  in Equation (7.7).
First step First, we treat the secrecy rate RS in Equation (2.23) as a
function of the BV for arbitrary but fixed g. We regard a BV
v˜(γ1, γ2, γ3, . . . , γnT ) = γ1w
⊥
ZF + γ2wZF +
nT∑
l=3
γlul (7.8)
with ‖v˜‖2 = 1 and an orthonormal basis {u3, . . . ,unT } that spans the
orthogonal complement of span{w⊥ZF,wZF} in CnT . Furthermore, all
γ = [γ1, . . . , γnT ] in Equation (7.8) are complex and
∑nT
l=1 |γl|2 = 1.
The power allocated to other directions than w⊥ZF and wZF has no im-
pact on |hHv˜|2, i.e., cannot improve the channel capacity from Alice to
Bob, as the receiver Bob is on the plane span{w⊥ZF,wZF} and all other
directions are orthogonal to this plane, as described above. Moreover,
allocating power to γ3, . . . , γnT in Equation (7.8) increases |gHv˜|2, and
hence decreases the secrecy rate, compared to the case where γi = 0 for
all i = 3, . . . , nT , except for the case when the eavesdropper is also on
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the plane span{w⊥ZF,wZF}, where the value remains unchanged. Conse-
quently, the BV v(γ1, γ2, 0, . . . , 0) with ‖v‖2 ≤ ‖v˜‖2 achieves a higher or
equal secrecy rate than the BV v˜, i.e.,
RS(v˜) ≤ RS(v). (7.9)
According to Lemma (B.2) in Appendix B.2, the secrecy rateRS increases
with increasing power allocated to the BV. Therefore, the following
relation holds
RS(v) ≤ RS(w) (7.10)
for a normalized BV w = v/‖v‖with ‖w‖2 = 1 ≥ ‖v‖2. The relations in
Equations (7.9) and (7.10) hold true for every realization of the random
variable g. Combining Equations (7.9) and (7.10) and evaluating the
distribution function of the continuous random variables RS(v˜), RS(v),
and RS(w) at RS yields the following relations for the corresponding
secrecy outage probabilities
Pr (RS(v˜) < R

S) ≥ Pr (RS(v) < RS) ≥ Pr (RS(w) < RS) .
Thus, the minimization in Equation (7.6) of Optimization Problem (7.7)
can only be achieved by a BV of norm one that allocates power in the
directions of w⊥ZF and wZF, i.e.,
w(
√
τeiϕ1 ,
√
1− τeiϕ2 , 0, . . . , 0)
= eiϕ1
(√
τ w⊥ZF +
√
1− τ ei(ϕ2−ϕ1)wZF
)
,
(7.11)
where the complex valued coefficients are written in their polar form
with τ, ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ R0+. Therewith, we found a parameterization for the
BV w similar to the one used in Equation (6.3), but with parameters that
are still complex valued. In the following, we show that it is sufficient to
use real valued parameters.
We observe that eiϕ1 in Equation (7.11) has no impact on |hHw|2 and
|gHw|2 in the Optimization Problem (7.7). Consequently, we choose
ϕ1 = 0. Further, ϕ2 = 0 maximizes |hHw|2 while keeping the distri-
bution of |gHw|2 unchanged. Therefore, we set ϕ2 = 0 and obtain the
parameterization in Equation (6.3).
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Second step In the second step of the proof we derive the secrecy
outage probability  in Equation (7.7) from the distribution of the random
variables.
By applying the uncertainty model of Definition (6.1) and defining
z =
1
ρ
(2−R

S − 1) + 2−RS
∣∣∣hHwLBF(τ)∣∣∣2 and (7.12)
ν = µ+
√
2 g˜HwLBF(τ) with µ =
√
2κτ
1− κ
dHh
‖Πdh‖ (7.13)
we can express the secrecy outage probability  of the Optimization
Problem (7.7) as
Pr
log2 1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2
1 + ρ |gHw|2 < R

S

= Pr
(∣∣gHwLBF(τ)∣∣2 > 1
ρ
(2−R

S − 1) + 2−RS
∣∣∣hHwLBF(τ)∣∣∣2)
= Pr
(∣∣gHwLBF(τ)∣∣2 > z)
= Pr
∣∣∣∣∣
√
2κτ
1− κ
dHh
‖Πdh‖ +
√
2 g˜HwLBF(τ)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
>
2z
1− κ
 (7.14)
= Pr
(
|ν|2 > 2z
1− κ
)
,
where the random variable g˜HwLBF(τ) is complex Gaussian distributed
with zero mean and variance one, which follows from the distribution
of g˜ and the power constraint ‖w‖2 = 1. Therefore, the random variable
ν is complex Gaussian distributed with mean µ and variance 2. Conse-
quently, the random variable |ν|2 is non-central χ2 distributed with two
degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter |ν|2.
The secrecy outage probability  can then be expressed as [Pro00]
 = Pr
(
|ν|2 > 2z
1− κ
)
= Q1
(
|ν| ,
√
2z
1− κ
)
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= Q1

√
2κτ
1− κ‖d‖,
√√√√2− 2RS+1 + 2ρ ∣∣∣hHwLBF(τ)∣∣∣2
2R

Sρ(1− κ)
 . 
(7.9) Corollary (Uniqueness of Solution).
For every given target secrecy rate RS , there exists a unique parameteri-
zation τ for the optimal BV in Equation (6.3) that solves the Optimization
Problem (7.7). X
The proof of this Corollary is given in Appendix B.3.
The optimal τ can be found using any search algorithm over the complete
set of BVs, e.g., bisection method. As this is quite slow and inefficient,
we will give a suboptimal but closed form solution in Section 7.1.2.
As for the ergodic secrecy rate, we can characterize the optimal transmit
strategy for the case where no CSI on the transmitter site is given.
(7.10) Corollary (Beamforming without CSI).
For κ = 0, the optimal parameter τ that maximizes the secrecy outage
probability in Equation (7.7) is τMRT = ‖Πdh‖2/‖h‖2. X
Proof.
If the transmitter has no CSI on the channel to the eavesdropper, i.e.,
κ = 0, the secrecy outage probability  given in Equation (7.14) reduces
to
 = Pr
(
|y|2 > z
)
=
∫ ∞
z
2e−2ydy (7.15)
= e−2z,
where y = |gHwLBF(τ)|2 and z is defined in Equation (7.12). Equa-
tion (7.15) follows from the fact that the random variable |y|2 is exponen-
tially distributed with rate parameter 2, i.e., |y|2 ∼ Exp(2).
Due to the exponential distribution and for a fixed value of the secrecy
outage probability , the condition of the Optimization Problem (7.7)
can be transformed into
 = e−2z ⇔ RS = log2
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHwLBF(τ)∣∣∣2
1− ρ2 ln 
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and the maximization problem in Equation (7.5) of the Optimization
Problem (7.7) can be expressed as
max
0≤τ≤1
log2
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHwLBF(τ)∣∣∣2
1− ρ2 ln 
,
which has the same solution as the strict concave maximization problem
(see Appendix B.4 for the proof of concavity) given by
max
0≤τ≤1
∣∣∣hHwLBF(τ)∣∣∣2 . (7.16)
As this maximization problem is identical to the maximization of the
transmission in a peaceful system without eavesdropper and the channel
to the receiver Bob is perfectly known, the optimal parameterization for
the BV is given by
τ∗ = τMRT =
‖Πdh‖2
‖h‖2 ,
which yields the MRT BV
w(τMRT) =
h
‖h‖ = wMRT. 
A Suboptimal Alternative
Using the Markov inequality [Bil95], which is given by
Pr (X ≥ a) ≤ E[X]
a
,
we get an upper bound on the secrecy outage probability derived by
Proposition (7.8).
For the approximation of the secrecy outage probability  under usage of
the Markov inequality, we use the probability expression of Optimization
Problem (7.7), which yields
Pr
(
|ν|2 > 2z
1− κ
)
≤
E
[
|ν|2
]
2z
1−κ
(7.17)
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with z and ν defined in Equations (7.12) and (7.13), respectively. Recall
that |ν|2 ∼ χ22(|µ|2). Therefore, the expectation is given by
E
[
|ν|2
]
= 4 + |µ|2 .
We insert this expectation into Equation (7.17) and get
Pr
(
|ν|2 ≥ 2z
1− κ
)
≤
(1− κ)
(
4 + |µ|2
)
2z
. (7.18)
Finally, we re-substitute the variable z (defined in Equation (7.12)) and
get the programming problem
min
0≤τ≤τMRT
(1− κ)
(
4 + |µ|2
)
2
(
1
ρ
(
2−RS − 1)+ 2−RS ∣∣∣hHwLBF(τ)∣∣∣2)
with τMRT = ‖Πdh‖2/‖h‖2. The optimal parameter τ that solves this
programming problem can be given in closed form1. This suboptimal
scheme is used for the illustrations in Chapter 8 as a reference value for
the secrecy outage probability.
7.2 Optimal Protection Strategies
In this section, we present beamforming schemes for the ergodic secrecy
rate and the secrecy outage probability under usage of AN as protection
strategy. In [NG05], the authors first introduced a method to increase the
secrecy rate by using AN. Later, AN is applied to a MISO system, where
the data transmission scheme used is MRT and the artificial noise is
transmitted uniformly in the null space of h in [ZM09]. Contrary to the
transmission scheme in [ZM09], we consider the optimal beamforming
of Section 7.1 and further optimize the transmit directions for the AN
signals.
Figure 7.1 shows the beamforming directions for the AN strategy which
is used in Propositions (7.13) and (7.19). The shaded plane in Figure 7.1
1The closed form expression is a long term which is not provided here. Nevertheless,
it can easily be derived by taking the first derivative of the right-hand side of Equa-
tion (7.18) with respect to τ and solving the resulting expression for τ .
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d
g
h
Noise(eq)
MRT LBF
Noise(opt)ξ
Noise(opt)(1−ξ)
Figure 7.1: Graphical interpretation of BVs and AN directions in 3D.
(named Noise(eq)) is the null space of h. The noise power is split by the
parameter ξ ∈ [0, 1] in order to use different directions. For ξ = 0, the
AN is equally distributed in this plane. If ξ > 0, the artificial noise is
split into two parts, where one is sent in the direction of the projection of
d onto the orthogonal basis of h (depicted in Figure 7.1 by Noise(opt)ξ).
The other part is sent into the null space of h, but also orthogonal to
the direction Noise(opt)ξ. For a system with three transmit antennas,
and therefore three dimensions for transmission, this would relate to the
direction Noise(opt)(1−ξ) in Figure 7.1.
7.2.1 Ergodic Secrecy Rate
Again, we first study the fast fading case. Therefore, we analyze the
ergodic secrecy rate (see Section 3.1).
(7.11) Definition (Ergodic Secrecy Rate with AN).
The ergodic secrecy rate RS for the MISO wiretap channel, where the
transmitter Alice additionally protects the data transmission by sending
AN in the null space of the main channel h (see Section 4.1), is given by
RS(w,W ) =[
Eh
[
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2)]− Eg[log2(1 + ρ ∣∣gHw∣∣2
1 + ρ ‖gHW ‖2
)]]+
.
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If the channel to the intended receiver Bob is known perfectly, the expec-
tation over h in the first term can be skipped, as the transmitter Alice
can choose an appropriate BV w for every realization of h. The ergodic
secrecy rate is then given by
RS(w,W ) =[
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2)− Eg[log2(1 + ρ ∣∣gHw∣∣2
1 + ρ ‖gHW ‖2
)]]+
. X
(7.12) Optimization Problem.
Alice splits her transmit power in order to transmit data and, simulta-
neously, protect the data transmission by sending AN in the null space
of the main channel h, i.e., hHW = 0. This leads to the programming
problem
max
w,W :‖w‖2=φ
trace(WWH)=(1−φ)
hHW=0
RS(w,W ),
where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. The BV w is used for data transmission whereas the
matrix W of dimension (nT − 1) × (nt − 1) is used to create artificial
noise. X
(7.13) Proposition.
The optimal transmit strategy solving the Optimization Problem (7.12) is
characterized by a power splitting parameter φ with 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 for data
transmission and artificial noise. Furthermore, the optimal Beamforming
Vector for the data is wLBF(τ) as in Equation (6.3) with 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1.
The artificial noise power is split into two parts ξ and (1 − ξ) with
0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. The artificial noise is constructed by an orthonormal basis for
the orthogonal complement of (h,Π⊥h d/‖Π⊥h d‖) denoted by u1, ...,unT−2.
Then the artificial noise is created by
rx =
√
ξ
Π⊥h d
‖Π⊥h d‖
r0 +
√
1− ξ
nT − 2
nT−2∑
k=1
ukrk, (7.19)
where r0, . . . , rnT−2 are i.i.d. complex zero-mean Gaussian random vari-
ables with variance one.
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The ergodic secrecy capacity from the solution of Optimization Prob-
lem (7.12) is given by
RS(τ, φ, ξ) = [log2 (1 + ΓB)− Eg[log2 (1 + ΓE)]]+ with (7.20)
ΓB = ρφ
∣∣∣hHwLBF(τ)∣∣∣2 and
ΓE =
ρφ
∣∣gHwLBF(τ)∣∣2
1 + ρ(1− φ)
(
ξ
∣∣∣gH Π⊥h d‖Π⊥h d‖ ∣∣∣2 + (1−ξ)nT−2 nT−2∑k=1 |gHuk|2
) . X
Proof.
The proof consists of two steps. At first, the optimal beamforming
strategy is derived. Then the optimal power allocation for the AN is
obtained.
First step The Optimization Problem (7.12) can be transformed into
two nested maximization problems
max
W :trace(WWH)=(1−φ)
hHW=0
(
max
w:‖w‖2=φ
RS(w,W )
)
. (7.21)
The inner optimization problem is almost identical to the Optimization
Problem (7.2) with increased noise plus interference in the second term,
i.e.,
max
w:‖w‖2=φ
[
log2
(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2)− Eg[log2(1 + ρ ∣∣gHw∣∣2
z
)]]+
(7.22)
where z ≥ 1 contains the noise variance plus AN. Therefore, the optimal
BV of the inner optimization in Equation (7.21) is identical to the optimal
BV of the Optimization Problem (7.2), which is given in Proposition (7.3).
Second step The second part of Proposition (7.13) is proved by show-
ing that the AN is optimally allocated in the (nT − 1)-dimensional sub-
space in Equation (7.19). The main observation is that there is only one
distinguished direction: the deterministic component d of the channel to
Eve. Therefore, we allocate power ξ(1− φ) for the AN in direction Π⊥h d.
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Obviously, the remaining (nT − 2)-dimensional subspace is spanned by
the corresponding vectors u1, . . . ,unT−2.
Let us allocate powerspi = [pi1, . . . , pinT−2] with
∑nT−2
l=1 pil = (1−ξ)(1−φ)
to the directions u1, . . . ,unT−2, respectively, and consider the second
term of the ergodic secrecy rate RS(τ, φ, ξ) in Equation (7.20), which is
given by
f(pi) = −Eg
[
log2
(
1 +
a
b+
∑nT−2
k=1 pik |gHuk|2
)]
with (7.23)
a = ρφ
∣∣gHwLBF(τ)∣∣2 ≥ 0 and
b = 1 + ρ(1− φ)ξ
∣∣∣∣∣gH Π⊥h d‖Π⊥h d‖
∣∣∣∣∣
2
> 0.
Note that |gHuk|2 = ‖
√
1− κ g˜Huk‖2 with k = 1, 2, . . . , nT − 2, because
uk is orthogonal to both h and Π⊥h d, which implies that uk is orthogonal
to Πhd+ Π⊥h d = d.
The random variable g˜ is circular symmetric complex Gaussian dis-
tributed. Therefore, f is a symmetric function in pi = [pi1, . . . , pinT−2], i.e.,
for any permutation [i1, . . . , inT−2] of the set {1, 2, . . . , nT − 2} it holds
f(pi1, . . . , pinT−2) = f(pii1 , . . . , piinT−2).
Further, the function is concave with respect to pi = [pi1, . . . , pinT−2]
in the interval [0,∞), because the second derivative of f with respect
to pi is negative. These two properties imply that the function is a
Schur-concave function [MO79; JB07] and the maximum is achieved for
pi1 = pi2 = . . . = pinT−2 = (1−ξ)(1−φ)/nT−2. 
As before in Section 7.1.1, τ depends only on the SNR ρ and the degree
of channel knowledge κ. Additionally, φ depends on the SNR ρ, while ξ
depends only on the channel knowledge κ, as this parameter shifts the
transmit power with growing κ from an equally distributed transmission
in the null space of Bob to the deterministic channel direction d. Again,
there can be made four observations, which are given in the following
corollaries.
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(7.14) Corollary (Beamforming without CSI).
For κ = 0, the optimal ξ, which maximizes the ergodic secrecy rate
RS(τ, φ, ξ) in Equation (7.20) converges to
ξ =
(1− ξ)
nT − 2 ⇔ ξ =
1
nT − 1 if nT > 1. (7.24)
This is due to the fact that we have no distinguished direction d for κ = 0.
Therefore, it is optimal to distribute the AN uniformly in the null space
of h. X
(7.15) Corollary (Beamforming with full CSI).
For κ = 1, the optimal ξ, which maximizes the ergodic secrecy rate
RS(τ, φ, ξ) in Equation (7.20) converges to one. This can be seen straight-
forward, as it is not reasonable to transmit artificial noise in any other
direction than the one to Eve. X
From Corollaries (7.14) and (7.15) follows that the optimal ξ in the er-
godic secrecy rateRS(τ, φ, ξ) given in Equation (7.20) is from the interval
[1/nT−1, 1].
(7.16) Corollary (Beamforming for low SNR).
For low SNR, i.e., ρ → 0, the optimal φ, which maximizes the ergodic
secrecy rate RS(τ, φ, ξ) in Equation (7.20) converges to one, i.e., the
artificial noise part converges to zero. X
Proof.
The Taylor series expansion of Equation (7.20) at ρ = 0 of the first degree
shows that for asymptotic low SNR the programming problem can be
rewritten as
max
φ:0≤φ≤1
[
φ
ln 2
(∣∣∣hHwLBF(τ)∣∣∣2 − ∣∣gHwLBF(τ)∣∣2)]+ . (7.25)
This programming problem can only be maximized, if the expression
|hHwLBF(τ)|2 − |gHwLBF(τ)|2 is non-negative. This is always given, as
the definition of the secrecy rate is such that Alice only transmits, if the
rate is positive. Obviously, the maximum of the above programming
problem is given by φ = 1. 
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(7.17) Corollary (Beamforming for high SNR with full CSI).
For κ = 1 and high SNR, i.e., ρ→∞, the optimal φ, which maximizes
the ergodic secrecy rate RS(τ, φ, ξ) in Equation (7.20) converges to one,
i.e., the artificial noise part converges to zero.
This is a generalization of Corollary (7.6), which states that for high
SNR and full CSI the optimal transmit strategy is given by ZF, i.e., the
eavesdropper receives no signal and therefore it is not necessary to
protect the signal by transmission of AN. X
7.2.2 Secrecy Outage Probability
Let us now study the protection strategy AN for the slow fading sce-
nario, where the chosen measure is the secrecy outage probability (see
Section 3.2).
(7.18) Optimization Problem.
Alice splits her transmit power in order to transmit data and, simulta-
neously, protect the data transmission by sending AN in the null space
of the main channel h, i.e., hHW = 0. This yields the programming
problem
max
w,W ,φ:‖w‖2=φ
trace(WWH)=(1−φ)
hHW=0
RS s.t. Pr
log2 1+ρ|hHw|2
1+
ρ|gHw|2
1+ρ‖gHW‖2
< RS
 = ,
(7.26)
where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. The BV w is used for data transmission whereas the
matrixW of the dimension (nT − 1)× (nT − 1) is used to create artificial
noise. Again, according to Theorem (B.1) in Appendix B.1, we can give
the equivalent minimization problem for a fixed target secrecy rate RS
min
w,W ,φ:‖w‖2=φ
trace(WWH)=(1−φ)
hHW=0
 s.t.  = Pr
log2 1+ρ |hHw|2
1+
ρ|gHw|2
1+ρ‖gHW‖2
< RS
 . (7.27)
X
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(7.19) Proposition.
The optimal transmit strategy solving the Optimization Problem (7.18)
can be characterized by a power splitting parameter φ with 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1
for data transmission and artificial noise. Furthermore, the optimal
Beamforming Vector for the data is wLBF(τ) as given in Equation (6.3)
with 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. The artificial noise power is split into two parts ξ
and (1 − ξ) with 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1. The artificial noise is constructed by an
orthonormal basis for the orthogonal complement of (h,Π⊥h d/‖Π⊥h d‖)
denoted by u1, ...,unT−2. Then the artificial noise is created by
rx =
√
ξ
Π⊥h d
‖Π⊥h d‖
r0 +
√
1− ξ
nT − 2
nT−2∑
k=1
ukrk
where r0, . . . , rnT−2 are i.i.d. complex zero-mean Gaussian random vari-
ables with variance one.
The secrecy rate that implements these power splitting mechanisms is
given by
RS(τ, φ, ξ) = [log2 (1 + ΓB)− log2 (1 + ΓE)]+ with (7.28)
ΓB = ρφ
∣∣∣hHwLBF(τ)∣∣∣2 and
ΓE =
ρφ
∣∣gHwLBF(τ)∣∣2
1 + ρ(1− φ)
(
ξ
∣∣∣gH Π⊥h d‖Π⊥h d‖ ∣∣∣2 + (1−ξ)nT−2 nT−2∑k=1 |gHuk|2
) . X
Proof.
The proof consists of two steps. At first, the optimal beamforming
strategy is derived. Then the optimal power allocation for the AN is
obtained.
First step The minimization problem Equation (7.27) given in Opti-
mization Problem (7.18) can be transformed into two nested minimiza-
7.2 Optimal Protection Strategies 51
tion problems
min
W :trace(WWH)=(1−φ)
hHW=0
 min
w:‖w‖2=φ

s.t.  = Pr
log2 1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2
1 + ρ|g
Hw|2
1+ρ‖gHW ‖2
< RS

 .
(7.29)
The inner optimization problem is almost identical to Equation (7.6)
of Optimization Problem (7.7) with increased noise plus interference
in the second term. Therefore, the optimal BV of the inner optimiza-
tion in Equation (7.29) is identical to the optimal BV of Optimization
Problem (7.7), which is given in Proposition (7.8).
Second step The second part of the proof of Proposition (7.19) is al-
most identical to the proof of Proposition (7.13). Solely, the function
f(pi) in Equation (7.23) differs and is for this proof given by
f(pi) = log2
(
1 +
a
b+
∑nT−2
k=1 pik |gHuk|2
)
with a and b as in Equation (7.23). 
Similar to the ergodic secrecy rate analysis in Section 7.2.1, we can make
some observations on the behavior of the secrecy outage probability for
certain special cases.
(7.20) Beamforming without CSI.
If no CSI is available, Corollary (7.14) holds. X
From this fact follows that the optimal ξ, which maximizes the secrecy
rate RS(τ, φ, ξ) given in Equation (7.28), is in the interval [1/nT−1, 1].
(7.21) Corollary (Beamforming for low SNR).
For low SNR, i.e., ρ→ 0, the optimal φ in Optimization Problem (7.18)
converges to one, i.e., the AN part converges to zero. X
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Proof.
Let us consider the minimum energy per information bit (Eb/N0)secmin that
is required to communicate reliable under secrecy constraints. This
performance measure for vanishing SNR per bandwidth is defined in
[Gur09] as (
Eb
N0
)sec
min
=
loge 2
R′S(0)
, (7.30)
where R′S(0) is the first derivative of RS with respect to the SNR ρ at the
point ρ = 0. Calculating
R′S(0) = φ
(∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2 − ∣∣gHw∣∣2) (7.31)
we can see that the AN term has been canceled out and R′S(0) is inde-
pendent of the AN. Combining Equations (7.30) and (7.31), we get(
Eb
N0
)sec
min
=
loge 2
φ
(∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2 − |gHw|2) .
The secrecy outage probability is expressed as
Pr
((
Eb
N0
)sec
min
>
(
Eb
N0
)target
min
)
= 
= Pr
 loge 2(
Eb
N0
)target
min
> φ
(∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2 − ∣∣gHw∣∣2)
 = .
It can be seen that this term is minimal for φ = 1, which yields the
(Eb/N0)
sec
min for the secrecy rate without AN. 
8 Illustrations
If not stated otherwise, all simulations show the ergodic secrecy rates
discussed in Sections 7.1.1 and 7.2.1, for a fading MISO wiretap chan-
nel with the uncertainty model specified in Definition (6.1) with four
transmit antennas from the transmitters point of view.
For the simulations, we kept the random channel realization g fixed for
one simulation and varied over the degree of channel knowledge κ. We
first generated the channel g and the random component g˜. Out of these
vectors, the deterministic part d =
√
κ g +
√
1− κ g˜ of the channel g to
Eve is calculated.
The secrecy rates are calculated with the channel realizations h and g
and the beamforming vectors derived by Alice based on her limited
knowledge about g. All rates are upper bounded by the secrecy capacity
that can be achieved for full CSI with the beamforming strategy given in
Theorem (2.10) (GEIG). For the simulations, we calculated the secrecy
rates derived by the Linear Beamforming (LBF) strategy given in Propo-
sition (7.3) and by the Linear Beamforming with AN (LBF + optAN)
strategy given in Proposition (7.13). For comparison, we computed the
secrecy rates derived by LBF plus equally distributed AN into the null
space of h (LBF + eqAN). This corresponds to the secrecy rate given
in Equation (7.20) for a fixed ξ = 1/nT−1. For comparison, we also cal-
culated the secrecy rates for MRT, ZF, and MRT and ZF plus equally
distributed AN in the null space of h (MRT + eqAN and ZF + eqAN,
respectively).
Figure 8.1 shows simulation results for the MISO WTC with four transmit
antennas. It can be seen, that in the case of no channel knowledge,
i.e., κ = 0, the LBF strategy is equal to the MRT, but superior to the
ZF strategy. This corresponds to Corollary (7.4). Similarly, the LBF +
optAN and LBF + eqAN strategies are equal to the MRT + optAN. As
stated in Corollary (7.5), in case of full CSI, i.e., κ = 1, ZF and all LBF
strategies achieve the upper bound given by the generalized eigenvector
in Theorem (2.10). All beamforming strategies with AN yield better
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Figure 8.1: Ergodic secrecy rates RS in bits/complex symbol over κ
in the MISO WTC with nT = 4 for different transmission
schemes with and without AN.
results than the strategies without AN for κ < 1. The gap between
strategies with and without AN increases with increasing SNR.
The simulations represent the secrecy outage probabilities for a fading
MISO WTC with the uncertainty model specified in Definition (6.1)
with four transmit antennas from the transmitters point of view. The
positions of the intended receiver and the eavesdropper are modeled by
the angle ψ between the channel h and the known deterministic channel
component d of the channel g, which is given by
ψ = arccos
∣∣∣hHd∣∣∣
‖h‖ ‖d‖ .
For the simulations, we calculate the secrecy outage probability derived
by the Linear Beamforming (LBF) strategy given by Proposition (7.8),
where we find the optimal τ by bisection method. This is possible due
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Figure 8.2: Comparison of the secrecy outage probabilities  derived by
Proposition (7.8) and the Markov bound on  given in Sec-
tion 7.1.2 as well as the corresponding optimal BV parameter
τ , plotted over κ and the SNR for RS = 0.8 bits/complex
symbol and ψ = 65◦ in the MISO WTC with nT = 4.
to the fact that the optimization problem has a unique solution as stated
in Corollary (7.9). Additionally, the Markov upper bound, described in
Section 7.1.2, is computed for comparison.
In Figure 8.2a, the secrecy outage probability  over the SNR and the
channel knowledge κ is plotted for a target secrecy rate of RS = 0.8
bits/complex symbol. The intuitive conclusion that the probability of
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Figure 8.3: Difference of the secrecy outage probabilities  in Figures 8.2a
and 8.2c.
occurrence of an outage event goes to zero as the degree of channel
knowledge goes to one, i.e., full channel knowledge, can be confirmed
by the figure. Figure 8.2b shows the optimal τ which achieves the
secrecy outage probabilities given in Figure 8.2a. For κ = 0, i.e., no
channel knowledge, the optimal beamforming strategy is given by MRT
according to Corollary (7.10). MRT is achieved for τ = 0.1786 for the
given channel realizations. With growing channel knowledge κ, the
optimal beamforming strategy goes to ZF. This convergence goes faster
in the high SNR regime.
For comparison, the Markov upper bound on the secrecy outage proba-
bility, as described in Section 7.1.2, and the corresponding τ are plotted
in Figures 8.2c and 8.2d. It can be observed, that the Markov bound
has a similar behavior as the secrecy outage probability derived by
Proposition (7.8). This can be seen in detail in Figure 8.3, where the dif-
ference between the secrecy outage probability derived by the Marcum
Q-function and the Markov bound is plotted. For this example, the gap
between the two curves is less than 0.03 in absolute.
Figure 8.4a compares once again the secrecy outage probability  derived
by Proposition (7.8) and the Markov bound, and is plotted over the
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Figure 8.4: Comparison of the secrecy outage probability , derived by
Proposition (7.8), and the Markov upper bound given in Sec-
tion 7.1.2 as well as the corresponding optimal BV parameter
τ over κ for RS = 0.8 bits/complex symbol, an SNR of 5 dB,
and ψ = 65◦.
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(b) Secrecy outage probability  = 0.1.
Figure 8.5: Maximized target secrecy rate RS over κ and the SNR for a
fixed secrecy outage probability  and ψ = 65◦.
degree of channel knowledge κ for a fixed SNR of 5 dB and an angle
ψ = 65◦ between the channel vectors h and d. For κ < 0.3 and κ > 0.95,
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the curves perform almost identically. Although the secrecy outage
probabilities behave quite similarly, the corresponding τ are quite differ-
ent, as can be seen in Figure 8.4b. For this channel realization, MRT is
achieved for τ = 0.1786.
Figure 8.5 shows the achievable target secrecy rates RS for a given
secrecy outage probability . If we fix the secrecy outage probability
 = 0.05, we can observe in Figure 8.5a that for low channel knowledge,
the target secrecy rate is zero. If we allow more secrecy outages, we
can achieve a positive target secrecy rate, as can be seen in Figure 8.5b,
where the secrecy outage probability is fixed to  = 0.1. Obviously, the
highest target secrecy rates can be achieved for full channel knowledge
and a high SNR. Additionally, the figures show that for full CSI the
target secrecy rates are independent of the secrecy outage probability .
This is due to the fact that we do not have secrecy outages for full CSI,
i.e., the transmitter only sends over the channel if a positive secrecy rate
can be achieved. The target secrecy rate RS is therefore only dependent
on the SNR.
Figure 8.6 shows the secrecy outage probabilities  with and without
AN in comparison as well as the parameters λ, φ, and ξ that are used to
derive the secrecy outage probability with AN. In Figure 8.6a, it can be
seen that AN reduces the secrecy outage probability by more than factor
10 over a wide range of κ. Especially for almost full CSI, e.g., κ = 0.8, the
advantage is even bigger, as the transmitter can disturb the eavesdropper
with a higher precision. For κ increasing to 1, the gap between both
the probabilities decreases. This is due to the fact that for the case with
full CSI on the channel to the eavesdropper no secrecy outages occur.
Observing the three power splitting parameters in Figure 8.6b, we can
see that for no CSI, i.e., κ = 0, the optimal beamforming strategy is given
by MRT, i.e., λ = 1. Furthermore, the AN is equally distributed in the
null space of the main channel, i.e., ξ = 1/nT−1 = 1/3. When κ increases
to one, the AN direction approaches Π⊥h d/‖Π⊥h d‖, i.e., ξ = 1. For the case
of almost full CSI, i.e., κ = 0.999, the optimal beamforming strategy
approaches the generalized eigenvector beamformer as described in
Theorem (2.10). The transmitter sends only data without AN, i.e., φ = 1,
thus ξ does not matter any longer and the value assigned in the figure has
no meaning. All parameters for the AN case are calculated by exhaustive
search over the complete set, i.e., λ ∈ [0, 1], φ ∈ [0, 1] and ξ ∈ [1/nT−1, 1].
In order to reduce the simulation time to an acceptable value, the step
60 8 Illustrations
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
κ

without AN, Marcum-Q solution with AN
(a) Secrecy outage probability .
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
κ
λ φ ξ
(b) Optimal λ, φ and ξ used for secrecy outage probability  derived by Proposition (7.19).
Figure 8.6: Comparison of secrecy outage probabilities , derived by
Propositions (7.8) and (7.19) and Section 7.1.2, and the opti-
mal parameters λ, φ and ξ for the AN case over κ forRS = 0.8
bits/complex symbol, an SNR of 10 dB, and ψ = 65◦.
61
width of the different parameters is chosen quite coarse, which results in
a small inaccuracy in some cases.

PART III
BEAMFORMING AND PROTECTION
STRATEGIES FOR TWO-HOP RELAY
CHANNELS
9 System Model
Alice
Relay
Eve
Bob
hR
hE
(a) Phase I
Alice
Relay
Eve
Bob
hE
gE
gB
(b) Phase II
Figure 9.1: System model of the non-regenerative two-hop relay WTC
with multiple antennas at Alice and Bob.
The two-hop relay WTC considered in this chapter is based on the non-
degraded MISO Gaussian WTC described in Section 2.4. The transmitter
Alice wants to send a confidential message over a relay to the intended
receiver Bob, while the eavesdropper Eve tries to decode this message.
Therefore, we have a four-node relay network without direct link be-
tween Alice and Bob as illustrated in Figure 9.1 and described in detail in
Section 2.5. The relay is operating in Amplify-and-Forward (AF) mode
and the relay and the eavesdropper have single antenna each while Alice
and Bob have nT and nD antennas, respectively. The receiver does not
necessarily need multiple antennas, i.e., nD ≥ 1. The channels from the
transmitter to the relay and the eavesdropper are denoted by hR and
hE , respectively. The channels from the relay to the destination and the
eavesdropper are then labeled as gB and gE . All nodes are operating in
half duplex mode. Hence, the communication from Alice to Bob requires
two phases.
We assume individual power constraints at the transmit nodes denoted
by PS,1 = E[|x|2] (first phase), PS,2 = E[|xn|2] (second phase) at the
source Alice andPR at the relay (second phase). Furthermore, we assume
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local CSI at the transmitter, i.e., Alice has perfect knowledge about her
channels to the relay and the eavesdropper. Additionally, we assume
that the relay communicates the channel estimation of the channel gE to
Alice, which results in Alice having an outdated gE .
(9.1) Definition.
The uncertainty at Alice on the channel gE is modeled as
gE = gˆE + ∆gE , (9.1)
where gˆE is the estimation on the channel gE and ∆gE is the estimation
error, which is bounded by |∆gE |2 ≤ . For  = 0, Alice has full CSI on
the channel gE . X
If the channel estimation is done at the relay using training-sequences,
the estimation error  can be modeled as a scaled version of the channel
estimation Mean Square Error (MSE) [Bjö+12; ZWN08]. Bob is assumed
to have local CSI, i.e., gB , for decoding purposes.
Denote the transmit beamformer of Alice in the first phase bywS,1. The
received signals at the relay and the eavesdropper in the first phase are
given by
yR = h
H
RwS,1x+ nR and
yE,1 = h
H
EwS,1x+ nE,1,
respectively. Accordingly, the received signals in the second phase at the
destination and the eavesdropper are given by
yB =
√
αwHBgB(h
H
RwS,1x+ nR) + nB and
yE,2 = h
H
EwS,2xn +
√
αgE(h
H
RwS,1x+ nR) + nE,2,
respectively, where
√
α is the multiplication scalar at the relay. The
scalars nB , nR, nE,1, and nE,2 are additive white complex Gaussian
noise with zero mean and variance σ2. The inverse noise power is
denoted by ρ = 1/σ2. The scalar xn is a signal sent by the source in order
to protect the main signal x, e.g., interference neutralization or artificial
noise signals. The receive beamforming vector at the intended receiver
Bob in the second phase is given by wB . The secrecy rate is then
RS = [C(ΓB)− C(ΓE)]+ , (9.2)
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where we defineC(SINR) = log2 (1 + SINR). The Signal-to-Interference-
plus-Noise Ratio (SINR) expressions are given according to the received
signals as
ΓB =
αρpS,1
∣∣wHBgB∣∣2 ∣∣∣hHRwS,1∣∣∣2
α
∣∣wHBgB∣∣2 + 1 , and
ΓE = ρpS,1
∣∣∣hHEwS,1∣∣∣2 + αρpS,1 |gE |2
∣∣∣hHRwS,1∣∣∣2
ρpS,2
∣∣∣hHEwS,2∣∣∣2 + α |gE |2 + 1 (9.3)
with
α =
ρpR
ρpS,1
∣∣∣hHRwS,1∣∣∣2 + 1 . (9.4)
To satisfy the power constraints at transmitter and relay, we need to have
0 ≤ pS,1 ≤ PS,1, 0 ≤ pS,2 ≤ PS,2 and 0 ≤ pR ≤ PR, respectively.
In Equation (9.3), the two observations made by the eavesdropper can be
identified. In the first term, we see the transmitted signal from the first
phase, where Alice sends with power pS,1 and transmit beamforming
vector wS,1. The second term corresponds to the second transmission
phase. Here, the eavesdropper gets the data signal over the relay, which
is then disturbed by the protection signal sent by Alice and the amplified
noise from the relay.
For the transmission of data and the protection signal, Alice performs
single-stream beamforming, while Bob performs receive beamforming
in order to maximize his receive signal. We define following BVs.
(9.2) Definition (Beamforming Directions).
The transmitter allocates her power such that the data stream and the
protection signal is send in a certain direction [TV08]. Similarly, the
receiver uses a receive beamforming vector to maximize his receive
signal. These vectors are given by
wMRC =
gB
‖gB‖
, wEveZF =
Π⊥hEhR
‖Π⊥hEhR‖
,
w
Relay
MRT =
hR
‖hR‖ , w
Eve =
ΠhEhR
‖ΠhEhR‖
,
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wEveMRT =
hE
‖hE‖ , wLBF(τ) =
√
τwEveZF +
√
1− τwEve,
where wMRC is the Maximum Ratio Combining (MRC) receive beam-
forming vector at Bob. The vectors wMRT and wEveMRT are the Maximum
Ratio Transmission (MRT) BVs in the directions of hR and hE , respec-
tively, applied at Alice. The Zero Forcing (ZF) beamforming vector
regarding Eve is given by wEveZF , i.e., the signal is sent in the direction
of the projection of hR onto the null space of hE , and the vector wEve
is the beamforming vector in the direction of the projection of hR onto
hE . The vector wLBF(τ) denotes the linear combination between the
BVs wEveZF and w
Eve, where τ ∈ [0, 1] has to be chosen appropriately.
Please note that this definition of wLBF(τ) differs from the one given in
Definition (6.3). X
Irrespective of the transmission scheme used by Alice and the channel
realizations, the legitimate receiver Bob maximizes his own receive signal
by applying MRC [TV08, p. 3.3.1], i.e., wB = wMRC.
10 Full Channel State Information
In this chapter, we assume that Alice has full CSI on all channels includ-
ing channel gE between the relay and Eve, i.e.,  = 0 in Definition (9.1).
For this scenario, we will determine the high-SNR slope and the high-
SNR power offset for different transmission strategies in the two-hop
channel with and without eavesdropper. Further, the high-SNR power
offsets of these transmission strategies will be compared analytically.
Some parts of the presented results of this chapter were published in
[Ger+12].
10.1 Beamforming Strategies
First, we will analyze beamforming strategies, where Alice transmits her
signal in the first phase and the relay sends the amplified signal to Bob
and Eve. No further protection of the sent signal is considered in this
section.
10.1.1 Peaceful System
In the peaceful system, Eve is not present. Therefore, we have a normal
two-hop channel, where Alice wants to maximize her transmission rate
to Bob.
The optimal transmit strategy for the peaceful system is given by MRT,
i.e., wS,1 = wMRT [TV08, Chapter 5.3.2]. Furthermore, Alice and the
relay should send their signals with full power in order to maximize the
transmission rate. The secrecy capacity is therefore given as
RP = C
(
αρPS,1 ‖gB‖2 ‖hR‖2
α ‖gB‖2 + 1
)
(10.1)
with α = ρPR
ρPS,1‖hR‖2+1 .
10.1 Beamforming Strategies 69
High-SNR Analysis
Following Definition (5.1), the high-SNR slope of the peaceful system is
given by
SP∞ = 1
and the high-SNR power offset (Definition (5.2)) is calculated to
LP∞ = log2
(
1
PS,1 ‖hR‖2
+
1
PR ‖gB‖2
)
. (10.2)
10.1.2 Eavesdropper System
In this system, the eavesdropper Eve is present, but Alice is using only
beamforming in order to protect the communication, i.e., no additional
jamming signal is sent and therefore PS,2 = 0.
The SINR terms are then given by
ΓB =
αρpS,1 ‖gB‖2
∣∣∣hHRwS,1∣∣∣2
α ‖gB‖2 + 1
,
ΓE = ρpS,1
∣∣∣hHEwS,1∣∣∣2 + αρpS,1 |gE |2
∣∣∣hHRwS,1∣∣∣2
α |gE |2 + 1
and α = ρpR
ρpS,1|hHRwS,1|2+1 .
Power Allocation
Let us have a look on the single transmission phases, in order to find
the optimal power allocations at transmitter and relay. The first trans-
mission phase in this scenario is similar to the MISO channel studied
in Section 2.4. Nevertheless, the beamforming strategy presented in
Theorem (2.10) is not necessarily optimal, as we need to take the second
transmission phase into account. The optimal beamforming strategy
is given by wS,1 = wLBF(τ), which also includes the generalized eigen-
value beamformer given in Theorem (2.10). As the maximization of the
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achievable secrecy rate is done over the beamforming strategy, Alice can
transmit the data signal with full power pS,1 = PS,1.
The second phase is similar to the SIMO wiretap channel [JM09]. The
relay has no further degrees of freedom and depends on the channel
realizations of gE and gB . If the channel gB to Bob is better than the
channel gE to Eve, the relay maximizes the transmission rate by sending
the signal with full power. Otherwise, the achievable secrecy rate is zero
and the relay should not transmit any signal. This would imply, that
the relay either needs to buffer the signal until an advantageous channel
realization appears or the signal is discarded. For our system model, we
assume that the relay has no buffer and is operating in a simple way,
i.e., the relay transmits the data signal regardless of the actual channel
realizations. Therefore, the relay transmits the signal with full power,
i.e., pR = PR.
High-SNR Analysis
For this transmission scheme, the high-SNR slope, defined in Defini-
tion (5.1), is given by
SEve∞ = 0.
10.2 Protection Strategies
Unfortunately, the high-SNR slope of the above transmission scheme in
the eavesdropper system is always zero. To overcome this disadvantage,
we need additional mechanisms to protect the communication in the
second phase. In the following, we will present two different protection
schemes. For both schemes it is advantageous to choose wS,1 = wEveZF ,
i.e., ZF in the first phase, so that the signal at Eve is set to zero.
10.2.1 Eavesdropper System with Artificial Noise
In this setting, Alice transmits in the first phase the data symbol with
ZF as described before, i.e., wS,1 = wEveZF . In the second phase, she
additionally sends an AN signal. As we have no direct link between the
transmitter and the intended receiver, Alice can choose the BV such that
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Alice sends data with wEveZF sends AN with w
Eve
MRT
Relay receives data sends amplified data
Bob – receives amplified data
Eve – receives amplified data + AN
Phase I Phase II
Table 10.1: Summary of send and receive operations of all nodes in the
two communication phases for the AN protection strategy.
the interference at the eavesdropper is maximized, i.e.,wS,2 = wEveMRT. A
summary of all send and receive operations can be found in Table 10.1.
The SINR terms are given accordingly as
ΓB =
αρpS,1 ‖gB‖2
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2
α ‖gB‖2 + 1
, (10.3)
ΓE =
αρpS,1 |gE |2
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2
ρpS,2 ‖hE‖2 + α |gE |2 + 1
(10.4)
with α = ρpR
ρpS,1|hHRwEveZF |2+1 .
Power Allocation
The optimal power allocation for Alice is easily determined. As Alice
transmits in the first phase with wEveZF in order to avoid information
leakage to the eavesdropper, she maximizes the achievable transmission
rate by sending with full power, i.e., pS,1 = PS,1. In the second phase,
Alice transmits an AN signal in order to disturb Eves receive signal. Bobs
receive signal is not affected, as there is no direct link between transmitter
and receiver available. Therefore, the SINR term ΓE in Equation (10.4) is
minimized and the achievable secrecy rate is maximized if we choose
pS,2 = PS,2.
For the power allocation at the relay, the following maximization prob-
lem can be formulated
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(10.1) Optimization Problem.
For the two-hop relay channel in Chapter 9, the achievable secrecy rate
RANS =
[
C
(
αρPS,1‖gB‖2|hHRwEveZF |2
α‖gB‖2+1
)
− C
(
αρPS,1|gE |2|hHRwEveZF |2
ρPS,2‖hE‖2+α|gE |2+1
)]+
with α =
ρpR
ρPS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 + 1
for the eavesdropper system with AN can be maximized over the power
pR at the relay
max
0≤pR≤PR
RANS . X
(10.2) Proposition.
The achievable secrecy rate RANS is unimodal in pR, 0 ≤ pR ≤ PR, with a
maximum at
p˜R =
√
‖gB‖2 |gE |2
(
ρPS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 + 1)(ρPS,2 ‖hE‖2 + 1)
ρ ‖gB‖2 |gE |2
.
The optimal power allocation p∗R at the relay solving the Optimization
Problem (10.1) is given by
p∗R = min (p˜R, PR) . X
The proof is given in Appendix C.1.
High-SNR Analysis
Due to the different possible power allocations, we need to distinguish
two cases for the calculation of the high-SNR slope and the high-SNR
power offset.
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First case p∗R = p˜R
For this case, the relay can use the optimal transmit power p˜R in order
to forward the signal, and the high-SNR slope is calculated to
SAN∞ = 1.
Further, the high-SNR power offset is given by
LAN∞ (p˜R) = log2
 1
PS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 +
pR |gE |2
PS,2 ‖hE‖2
· 1
pR ‖gB‖2
+
2 |gE |2√
PS,1PS,2
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 ‖gB‖2 ‖hE‖2 |gE |2
 . (10.5)
Second case p∗R = PR
If the power at the relay is limited by the power constraint PR, the
high-SNR slope is also calculated to
SAN∞ = 1,
while the high-SNR power offset is given by
LAN∞ (PR) = log2
 1
PS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 +
1
PR ‖gB‖2
+
PR |gE |2
PS,2 ‖hE‖2
 1
PS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 +
1
PR ‖gB‖2

 . (10.6)
10.2.2 Eavesdropper System with Information Leakage
Neutralization
For this transmission scheme, Alice chooses ZF as beamforming strategy
in the first phase, in order to prevent Eve from eavesdropping. In the
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Alice sends data with wEveZF sends IN with w
Eve
MRT
Relay receives data sends amplified data
Bob – receives amplified data
Eve – –
Phase I Phase II
Table 10.2: Summary of send and receive operations of all nodes in the
two communication phases for the IN protection strategy.
second phase, she sends the IN signal as introduced in Section 4.2, i.e.,
xn = −
√
αgEh
H
Rw
Eve
ZF
hHEwS,2
x.
Alice chooses the transmit beamforming vector in this phase such that
the protection by the neutralization signal at Eve is maximized, i.e.,
wS,2 = w
Eve
MRT. Again, a summary of the send and receive operations at
all nodes can be found in Table 10.2.
The secrecy rate is then given by
RINS = C
αρpS,1 ‖gB‖2
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2
α ‖gB‖2 + 1
 , (10.7)
where α = ρpR
ρpS,1|hHRwEveZF |2+1 .
Power Allocation
Unfortunately, this scheme depends on the power usage at the relay
and/or on the power constraint at the transmitter. In the following, we
derive an adaptive power constraint for Alice. Alternatively, we can
optimize the power allocation at the relay.
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Adaptation of the Power Constraint at Alice
We assume that the relay transmits with full power PR. In order to
successfully neutralize the forwarded signal at the eavesdropper, the
transmit power at Alice has to fulfill the IN power constraint according
to Definition (4.2), which we rewrite to
Ex
[
|xn|2
]
= pS,1pS,2 +
pS,2
ρ
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 −
pS,1PR |gE |2
‖hE‖2
≥ 0.
We assume individual power constraints in the first and second phase
and set, without loss of generality, pS,1 = pS,2 = pS , where 0 ≤ pS ≤ PS
and PS = PS,1 = PS,2. Therefore, the inequality can be written as
p2S + pS
 1
ρ
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 −
PR |gE |2
‖hE‖2
 ≥ 0.
The power constraint per phase at Alice has to be at least
P ∗S ≥

PR|gE |2
‖hE‖2 −
1
ρ|hHRwEveZF |2 if ‖hE‖
2 ≤ ρPR
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 |gE |2
0 otherwise
in order to successfully cancel the receive signal from the relay at the
eavesdropper Eve.
This result implies that there are cases where Alice needs much more
power than she has available to successfully eliminate this signal at Eve.
As this is not realistic in general, we optimize the power allocation at the
relay instead.
Optimal Power Allocation at the Relay
If we permit the relay to transmit not only with full power, but also with
a fraction of the maximal available power PR, i.e., 0 ≤ pR ≤ PR, the
power constraint for the IN can be met, while Alice transmits with full
power in both phases.
(10.3) Optimization Problem.
For the two-hop relay channel in Chapter 9, the achievable secrecy rate
RINS for the eavesdropper system with IN in Equation (10.7) can be
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maximized over the transmit power pR at the relay with subject to the
IN power constraint given in Definition (4.2)
max
0≤pR≤PR
ρpRPS,1 ‖gB‖2
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2
pR ‖gB‖2 +
(
PS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 + 1ρ)
s.t.
ρpRPS,1 |gE |2
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2(
ρPS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 + 1) ‖hE‖2 ≤ PS,2. (10.8)X
We can reformulate the IN power constraint to
pR ≤ PS,2 ‖hE‖
2
|gE |2
1 + 1
ρPS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2
 .
In the following, let us denote the IN power constraint with
pINR :=
PS,2 ‖hE‖2
|gE |2
1 + 1
ρPS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2
 .
(10.4) Corollary.
The optimal power allocation p∗R at the relay solving the Optimization
Problem (10.3) is given by
p∗R = min
(
pINR , PR
)
. X
Corollary (10.4) follows directly from the power constraint at the relay
and the IN power constraint formulated in Definition (4.2).
High-SNR Analysis
Because of the two possible power allocations, we have to distinguish
two different cases for the calculation of the high-SNR slope and the
high-SNR power offset.
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First case p∗R = p
IN
R
For this case the transmit power at the relay is bounded by the IN power
constraint and the secrecy rate is given by
RINS (p
IN
R ) = C
ρ PS,1PS,2 ‖hE‖2
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 ‖gB‖2
PS,2 ‖hE‖2 ‖gB‖2 + PS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 |gE |2
 .
The high-SNR slope in Definition (5.1) for RINS (p
IN
R ) is given by
S IN∞ (pINR ) = 1
and the high-SNR power offset in Definition (5.2) can be calculated to
LIN∞(pINR ) = log2
 1
PS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 +
pR |gE |2
PS,2 ‖hE‖2
· 1
pR ‖gB‖2
 . (10.9)
Second case p∗R = PR
If the power at the relay is limited by the power constraint PR, the
secrecy rate is given by
RINS (PR) = C
ρ PRPS,1 ‖gB‖2
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2
PR ‖gB‖2 + PS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 + 1ρ
 .
Once again, the high-SNR slope is calculated to
S IN∞ (PR) = 1
and the high-SNR power offset is given by
LIN∞(PR) = log2
 1
PS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 +
1
PR ‖gB‖2
 . (10.10)
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10.3 Comparison of High-SNR Power Offsets
Let us now take a closer look on the three schemes, where the high-SNR
slope equals one, i.e., the peaceful system, the eavesdropper system with
AN and the eavesdropper system with IN, and compare the high-SNR
power offset expressions.
Comparing the expression for the peaceful system in Equation (10.2)
and the one for the eavesdropper system with IN when the system is
limited by the transmit power constraint at the relay in Equation (10.10),
we find, that they only differ in the first term. In the peaceful system the
transmitter uses MRT to send the data signal to the relay, while in the
IN protected system the transmitter has to use ZF, which results in the
power offset difference.
Similar observations can be made, if we compare the expressions of
the eavesdropper system with AN limited by the transmit power con-
straint PR in Equation (10.6) with those of the peaceful system in Equa-
tion (10.2). Again, the first term only differs in the transmission strat-
egy at Alice, while the second term is identical. However, the AN
protected scheme has in addition the same terms scaled by the ratio
PR|gE |2/PS,2‖hE‖2, which is the power forwarded by the relay in direction
of Eve divided by the jamming power at Alice in direction of Eve.
This ratio is again visible, if we have a look at the eavesdropper system
with AN with optimal transmit power allocation p˜R in Equation (10.5)
and for the eavesdropper system with IN limited by the IN power
constraint pINR in Equation (10.9).
The observations for the IN scheme are expressed analytically in the
following corollary.
(10.5) Corollary.
The difference in the high-SNR power offset between the peaceful system
and the eavesdropper system with IN is given by
∆L∞(PR) = LP∞ − LIN∞(PR)
= log2

(
PR ‖gB‖2 + PS,1 ‖hR‖2
) ∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2(
PR ‖gB‖2 + PS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2) ‖hR‖2

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if the transmit power at the relay is limited by the transmit power con-
straint PR or
∆L∞(pINR ) = LP∞ − LIN∞(pINR )
= log2

(
PS,1 ‖hR‖2 + PR ‖gB‖2
)
PS,2 ‖hE‖2
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2(
PS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 |gE |2 + PS,2 ‖gB‖2 ‖hE‖2)PR ‖hR‖2

if the transmit power is limited by the IN power constraint pINR . X
(10.6) Remark.
In the case where the transmit power at the relay is limited by the
transmit power constraint PR, the high-SNR power offset difference gets
zero, i.e., ∆L∞(PR) = 0, if and only if wEveZF = wMRT, i.e., the channels
hR and hE are orthogonal. X
Furthermore, the protection scheme with AN depends on the channel
realizations and the SNR, as can be seen from following proposition.
(10.7) Proposition.
For the eavesdropper system with AN, the achievable secrecy rate RANS
becomes positive if
ρ >
[
|gE |2 − ‖gB‖2
PS,2 ‖gB‖2 ‖hE‖2
]+
. X
The proof is given in Appendix C.2.
11 Partial Channel State Information
The previously met assumption of full CSI on all channels at the trans-
mitter Alice is very unrealistic. In this chapter, we assume, that the relay
feeds the channel estimation of the channel gE back to Alice, which
results in an outdated CSI of gE at Alice as specified in Definition (9.1).
We examine applicable beamforming and protection strategies and in-
vestigate the optimal power allocation of these schemes during the two
transmit phases at the transmitter and the relay. Further, we will note
that only the IN scheme is affected by this partial channel knowledge.
Within this chapter, we present results that were partially published in
[EHJ13].
11.1 Beamforming Strategies
Again, we first analyze the pure beamforming strategies without any
protection mechanisms during the second transmission phase. The focus
of the analysis will be mainly on the power allocation.
11.1.1 Peaceful System
The scenario of the peaceful system with partial CSI is identical to the
scenario with full CSI. This is due to the fact that the channel gE between
the relay and the eavesdropper, which is considered as not perfectly
known, is not present in this scenario. Therefore, the same results as in
Section 10.1.1 apply.
11.1.2 Eavesdropper System
Similarly, the eavesdropper system with full and partial CSI give identi-
cal beamforming strategies at Alice. This is due to the fact that Alice has
no possibility to influence the receive signal at Eve during the second
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phase. Therefore, she will apply the same beamforming strategy as
discussed in Section 10.1.2.
11.2 Protection Strategies
The fact that we have only partial CSI has significant influence if we
analyze the protection strategies during the second phase. Again, we
assume that Alice performs ZF during the first transmission phase,
i.e., wS,1 = wEveZF , so that no information leaks to the eavesdropper
during this phase. Further, she uses MRT during the second phase,
i.e., wS,2 = wEveMRT, in order to maximize the effect of the protection
strategy.
11.2.1 Eavesdropper System with Artificial Noise
For the system model in Chapter 9, we assume that the relay feeds the
CSI of the channel gE to the eavesdropper back to Alice. This does not
only imply that Alice has only an outdated CSI, but also that the relay
knows the current CSI on this channel.
For the transmitter, it is unimportant to know the actual CSI in order to
jam Eve. Therefore, the power allocation at Alice is identical to the case
of full CSI in Section 10.2.1. As the relay knows the actual channel state,
the Optimization Problem (10.1) is still valid and we also get the same
power allocation at the relay as before in Section 10.2.1.
11.2.2 Eavesdropper System with Information Leakage
Neutralization
For the eavesdropper system with IN, Alice needs to know the CSI of
the channel gE between relay and Eve perfectly in order to eliminate the
receive signal at the eavesdropper completely.
For the case, where Alice only has partial CSI, e.g., outdated information
on the channel gE , we can analyze the performance impact. In order to
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examine this performance impact of IN due to the partial CSI, we define
the information leakage power of the desired eavesdropping signal,
L(xn) =
∣∣∣hHEwEveMRTxn +√αgEhHRwEveZF x∣∣∣2 ,
where α = ρpR
ρpS,1|hHRwEveZF |2+1 .
Given only an estimate gˆE of the channel gE at Alice, we show in the
following that the worst case1 information leakage power is minimized
by sending the information again, i.e., xn is a function of x, and treating
the imperfectly known channel gˆE as if it is known perfectly.
(11.1) Proposition.
The optimal IN transmit signal xn with regard to the minimized leakage
power L(xn) and the worst case channel estimation error |∆gE |2 is given
by
arg min
xn
max
|∆gE |2≤
L(xn) = −
√
αgˆEh
H
Rw
Eve
ZF
hHEw
Eve
MRT
x.
X
The proof is given in Appendix D.1.
From Proposition (11.1) and the BVs in Definition (9.2), the worst case
receive signal at Eve in the second phase can be calculated to
yE,2 = h
H
Ew
Eve
MRTxn +
√
αgE(h
H
Rw
Eve
ZF x+ nR) + nE,2
=
√
α∆gEh
H
Rw
Eve
ZF x+ ∆gE
(
gˆE −
√

)
nR + nE,2
and the corresponding worst case SINR is therefore given by
max
|∆gE |2≤
ΓE =
αρpS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2
α (|gˆE | −
√
)
2
+ 1
.
An achievable secrecy rate for the two-hop wiretap channel with partial
CSI is given by
RINS = C
αρpS,1 ‖gB‖2
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2
α ‖gB‖2 + 1
− C
αρpS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2
α (|gˆE | −
√
)
2
+ 1
 .
1Please note that the worst case is always from Alice’ point of view. This means that for
Eve it is the best case.
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(11.2) Remark.
In order to achieve this secrecy rate, a wiretap code is needed again, as
we cannot prevent information leakage completely due to the partial
channel knowledge of gE at Alice. X
11.2.3 Optimization Problem
We are interested in the optimal power allocations at the transmitter
and the relay. Due to the fact that Alice performs ZF with respect to
Eve during the first phase, she will always transmit with full power
pS,1 = PS,1 in order to maximize the receive signal at the relay. Therefore,
it remains to optimize the power allocations for the second phase at the
relay and the transmitter which maximize the secrecy rate RINS .
From Equation (9.4) and Definition (4.2), the IN power constraint at the
relay is
pR ≤
pS,2 ‖hE‖2
(
ρPS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 + 1)
ρPS,1 |gˆE |2
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 . (11.1)
(11.3) Remark.
Note that pS,2 correlates with pR as the power values must be chosen
jointly such that the leakage signals from source and relay add to zero.X
(11.4) Optimization Problem.
For the two-hop relay channel with partial CSI, the achievable secrecy
rate RINS for the eavesdropper channel with IN can be maximized over
the power pR at the relay
max
pR
RINS
s.t. pR ≤
PS,2 ‖hE‖2
(
ρPS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 + 1)
ρPS,1 |gˆE |2
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 ,
0 ≤ pR ≤ PR. X
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11.2.4 Analysis of Monotony of the Secrecy Rate
For convenience of notation, let us denote the effective received SNR at
the relay as
ρ˜ = ρPS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 (11.2)
and define the worst case channel gain as
|g˜E |2 =
(|gˆE | − √)2 .
(11.5) Proposition.
The optimal power allocation p∗R at the relay solving the Optimization
Problem (11.4) is given in Table 11.1, where
pmaxR =
PS,2‖hE‖2
|gˆE |2
(
1 + 1ρ˜
)
,
p˜R =
(1+ρ˜)
(√
‖gB‖2(ρ˜(‖gB‖2−)+s)s+‖gB‖2(|g˜E |2−)
)
ρ‖gB‖2(ρ˜s+‖gB‖2−|g˜E |4)
,
p0R =
(ρ˜+1)(‖gB‖2−)
ρ‖gB‖2(−|g˜E |2)
, and
s = ‖gB‖2 − |g˜E |2 . X
The corresponding optimal power allocation p∗S,2 is given by
p∗S,2 =
p∗Rρ˜ |gˆE |2
‖hE‖2 (ρ˜+ 1)
.
The proof is given in Appendix D.2.
From Table 11.1, there are only four different outcomes of the power
allocation p∗R depending on the behavior of the secrecy rate R
IN
S .
As long as the channel gain ‖gB‖2 to the intended receiver is greater than
the uncertainty over the channel |gE |2, i.e., the estimation error  (case i)
to iii)), the secrecy rate is positive at certain values of pR. In particular, in
the case where RINS is quasi-concave (case ii b) and iii)), the secrecy rate
starts positive for pR = 0 and becomes negative for large values of pR.
If the secrecy rate is monotonic increasing in pR (case i) and ii a)), the
optimal power allocation is either bounded by the power constraint PR
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Case Behavior of RINS
with regard to pR
Optimal power allocation p∗R
i) |g˜E |2 > ‖gB‖2 >  monotonic
increasing
p∗R = min
(
pmaxR , PR
)
ii) ‖gB‖2 > |g˜E |2 > 
a)
(
|g˜E |4 + |g˜E |2 ρ˜
)
>  ‖gB‖2 (1 + ρ˜) monotonic
increasing
p∗R = min
(
pmaxR , PR
)
b)
(
|g˜E |4 + |g˜E |2 ρ˜
)
<  ‖gB‖2 (1 + ρ˜) quasi-concave p∗R = min
(
p˜R, p
max
R , PR
)
iii) ‖gB‖2 >  > |g˜E |2 quasi-concave p∗R = min
(
p˜R, p
max
R , PR
)
iv) |g˜E |2 >  > ‖gB‖2 quasi-convex p∗R =

pmaxR if p
0
R < p
max
R < PR
PR if p0R < PR ≤ pmaxR
0 otherwise
v)  > |g˜E |2 > ‖gB‖2 rate not positive p∗R = 0
vi)  ≥ ‖gB‖2 ≥ |g˜E |2 rate not positive p∗R = 0
Table 11.1: The behavior of the secrecy rate RINS with regard to pR and
the optimal power allocation p∗R.
at the relay or by the power constraint PS,2 at the transmitter, i.e., pmaxR is
optimal.
As soon as the estimation error  becomes greater than the worst case
channel gain |g˜E |2, i.e., the uncertainty about the channel from the relay
to the eavesdropper is greater than the noise Eve will get in the worst case
scenario (from Alice’ point of view), the secrecy rate becomes decreasing
with growing pR. As ‖gB‖2 is still greater than , the secrecy rate is
quasi-concave and has a maximum at the optimal power allocation p˜R
(case ii b) and iii)).
For the case where the worst case estimation error  is greater than the
channel gain ‖gB‖2 (case iv)), the secrecy rate RINS is zero if only a small
amount of power is allocated. As soon as we allocate more power than
p0R, the secrecy rate becomes monotonic increasing as long as the worst
case channel gain |g˜E |2 to Eve is greater than the estimation error and
the channel to Bob. Therefore, the optimal power allocation is again
either bounded by the power constraint PR at the relay or by the power
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constraint PS,2 at the transmitter, as long as these power constraints are
greater than p0R. Otherwise, the secrecy rate is zero and no power should
be allocated.
Finally, if the estimation error  is greater than the channel ‖gB‖2 to
the intended receiver Bob and the worst case channel gain |g˜E |2 to
the eavesdropper (case v) and vi)), the secrecy rate is always zero and
therefore no power should be allocated at the relay and the transmitter.
This corresponds to the case where the transmitter has almost no or has
no CSI about the channel from the relay to the eavesdropper. Therefore,
Alice is not able to compute any IN signal in order to null out the
information leaked to Eve. In these two cases, Alice should use AN in
order to protect the second phase.
(11.6) Proposition.
As the SNR goes to infinity, the secrecy rate RINS with partial CSI ap-
proaches
lim
ρ→∞R
IN
S = log2
(
pR|g˜E |2‖gB‖2+pS,1‖gB‖2|hHRwEveZF |2
pR‖gB‖2+pS,1|hHRwEveZF |2
)
.
X
Proposition (11.6) follows from direct calculations.
12 Illustrations
For the simulations, we used a geometric channel model with a path loss
coefficient of a = 2. As depicted in Figure 12.1, the nodes were placed
on a 20 by 20 grid with the following positions:
Alice: [04 10] Bob: [16 10]
Relay: [10 12] Eve: [10 07]
Alice Bob
Relay
Eve
hR
hE
gB
gE
Figure 12.1: Positions of transmitter Alice, relay, eavesdropper Eve and
legitimated receiver Bob on a 20 by 20 grid.
The channels were generated randomly and weighted by the distances
between the nodes. The transmitter was equipped with four antennas,
while the receiver had only two antennas. The power constraints at the
transmitter and the relay were set to PS,1 = PS,2 = PR = 10 dB.
In the case of IN with full CSI, the power at the relay was adapted
according to Corollary (10.4), while for the AN case, the power allocation
in Proposition (10.2) was used.
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For the IN scheme with partial CSI, the maximum estimation error 
over the channel gE is calculated to  = 1/SNR2 + δ, where δ is a constant
which represents the delay caused by the need of feeding back the CSI
from the relay to the receiver. The corresponding simulations represent
the power allocation presented in Proposition (11.5).
For the simulations, two channel realizations were specifically chosen as
examples.
(12.1) Example.
Channel realization, with a weak link between the relay and the eaves-
dropper:
|hR|2 =

0.000372
0.000039
0.000172
0.000720
 , |hE |2 =

0.000642
0.000304
0.002434
0.000327
 ,
|gB |2 =
[
0.000656
0.000649
]
, and |gE |2 = 0.000855.
(12.2) Example.
Channel realization, where the channel gain of the link between the relay
and the eavesdropper is advantageous:
|hR|2 =

0.002616
0.000547
0.000730
0.002477
 , |hE |2 =

0.000437
0.000405
0.000566
0.000234
 ,
|gB |2 =
[
0.000180
0.000037
]
, and |gE |2 = 0.007324.
Figures 12.2 and 12.3 show the instantaneous channel capacity for the
peaceful system according to Equation (10.1) denoted by RP and the
achievable instantaneous secrecy rate of the two protection schemes IN,
introduced in Section 10.2.2 and labeled as RINS , and AN, described in
Section 10.2.1 and denoted by RANS , where Alice has full CSI on all chan-
nels. Additionally, the figures show the achievable instantaneous secrecy
rates RLBFS , R
ZF
S and R
MRT
S , which are derived by the rate expressions
in Section 10.1.2 with beamforming vectors wLBF(τ), wEveZF and wMRT,
respectively. In Figure 12.2, we use the channel realizations according
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Figure 12.2: Instantaneous capacity for the peaceful system and instan-
taneous achievable secrecy rates for various beamforming
and protection schemes over the SNR with nT = 4, nD = 2,
and PS,1 = PS,2 = PR = 10dB (Example (12.1)).
to Example (12.1). It can be seen, that both protection schemes have
the same slope as the peaceful system. Furthermore, the IN protected
scheme is almost as good as the peaceful system and better than the AN
protected scheme. Due to the missing protection of the data signal in
the second phase, the three beamforming schemes perform badly in the
high SNR regime. This can be seen even better in Figure 12.3.
For Figure 12.3, the channel realizations of Example (12.2) were used.
Due to the worse channel between Alice and Eve, Alice has not enough
power to send the IN signal and the power at the relay has to be de-
creased in order to meet the IN power constraint. This results in a lower
transmission rate to Bob and therefore also a lower achievable secrecy
rate. For the same reason, the AN scheme performs even worse, as the
AN signal disturbs Eve not enough. Furthermore, the AN rate is zero
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Figure 12.3: Instantaneous capacity for the peaceful system and instan-
taneous achievable secrecy rates for various beamforming
and protection schemes over the SNR with nT = 4, nD = 2,
and PS,1 = PS,2 = PR = 10dB (Example (12.2)).
for ρ ≤ 26.7325 and gets positive for ρ > 26.7325, as stated in Proposi-
tion (10.7). For these special channel realizations, all beamforming rates
are zero, as the effective channel from Alice over the relay to Eve is better
than the effective channel from Alice over the relay to Bob.
Figures 12.4 and 12.5 show how the IN scheme performs for partial
CSI at Alice. The achievable instantaneous secrecy rate RINS for the IN
scheme with partial CSI is compared to several base line systems:
• The channel capacity RP of the peaceful system without eaves-
dropper as described in Section 10.1.1,
• The achievable secrecy rate RLBFS of the eavesdropper system,
where Alice only uses an optimized beamformer as presented in
Section 10.1.2,
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• The achievable secrecy rate RANS of the AN protected scheme de-
scribed in Section 10.2.1, and
• The IN protected secrecy rate RINS with full CSI as presented in
Section 10.2.2.
Note, that the IN protection scheme is the only scheme that is influ-
enced by the partial CSI on the channel gE , as discussed in the previous
chapter.
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Figure 12.4: Instantaneous capacity for the peaceful system and instan-
taneous achievable secrecy rates for various protection
schemes over the SNR with nT = 4, nD = 2, PS,1 = PS,2 =
PR = 10dB and varying delay δ (Example (12.2)).
The instantaneous rates in Figure 12.4 are achievable with the channel
realizations of Example (12.2). For the secrecy rate RINS for partial CSI in
Figure 12.4, where the delay δ equals zero, the transmitter has instantly
the channel estimation over the channel gE . Although this scenario is
quite unrealistic, we can see clearly, that the IN schemes for full and
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partial CSI perform identically well. If the delay is greater than zero, e.g.,
δ = 0.0001, the IN scheme for partial CSI is performing worse than the
IN scheme for full CSI in the high SNR regime. This is due to the fact
that with outdated CSI the system gets limited in the high SNR regime as
stated in Proposition (11.6). For the chosen channel realizations, the IN
schemes outperform the AN scheme. Especially in the mid SNR range,
the AN scheme still achieves zero secrecy rates, while the IN schemes
achieve positive rates. Due to the missing protection of the data signal
in the second phase, the beamforming scheme is zero.
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Figure 12.5: Instantaneous achievable secrecy rates over SNR for IN
protected schemes with full and partial CSI (δ = 0.0001),
nT = 4, nD = 2, PS,1 = PS,2 = 10dB and PR = 50dB
(Example (12.1)).
If we apply a simplified power allocation algorithm, where the power
at the relay and the transmitter in the second phase are either bounded
by the power constraint PS,2 or by the power constraint PR, we achieve
a suboptimal secrecy rate RINS . Figure 12.5 shows for δ = 0.0001 and
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PR = 50dB how this suboptimal scheme performs compared to the
optimal IN schemes for full and partial CSI. For the mid SNR range the
achievable rates of the optimal and the suboptimal scheme for partial
CSI are identical , while in the high SNR regime the gap is growing. For
most channel realizations, the suboptimal scheme performs as good as
the optimal IN scheme, e.g., in cases i) and ii) a) in Table 11.1. Therefore,
a simplified power allocation algorithm can be applied, if we accept that
for a few channel realizations the achievable secrecy rate is lower than
the optimum.

PART IV
CONCLUSION
13 Conclusion and Open Topics
Conclusion
Within this thesis, we investigated the possibilities of physical layer se-
crecy for two special system models. In detail, we studied beamforming
and protection strategies in the MISO Gaussian WTC and the Gaussian
two-hop relay WTC with multiple antennas at transmitter and receiver.
In both system models, we examined the influence of partial CSI on the
link to the eavesdropper and compared the achievable secrecy rates with
the case of full CSI.
We showed for the MISO WTC that in the fast fading scenario the BV
can be optimized such that the ergodic secrecy rate is maximized with
regard to the degree of channel knowledge. Further it was shown that
the ergodic secrecy rate can be significantly increased by usage of AN, if
applied in a smart way. This means that the degree of channel knowledge
on the link to the eavesdropper influences the portion of power that is
spent for AN at the transmitter as well as the direction, in which the AN
signal is sent.
In addition, we found that the same beamforming and protection strate-
gies applied to the slow fading scenario also reduces the secrecy outage
probability. Besides, a simplified, however suboptimal beamforming
scheme, where the BV can be given in closed form, was established.
For the two-hop relay WTC, we introduced Information Leakage Neu-
tralization (IN) as a new protection strategy. If applied to a system
model, where the transmitter has full CSI, the instantaneous secrecy rate
performs almost as well as the instantaneous capacity of the peaceful
system without an eavesdropper. The gap between both rates results
from the fact, that for the peaceful system the transmitter can use MRT,
which maximizes the rate, while in the IN protected system the trans-
mitter needs to send with ZF in order to prevent information leakage
during the first transmission phase. In any case, the IN protected scheme
outperforms the AN protected approach and performs much better than
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any beamforming scheme without additional protection mechanism.
Another positive aspect of the IN protected scheme in the case of full
CSI is that conventional channel codes can be applied instead of wiretap
codes.
For the case of partial CSI, where the transmitter has only an outdated
estimate on the channel between relay and the eavesdropper, we could
show that the IN protected scheme can also be applied. The optimal
joint power allocation at the transmitter and the relay could be deter-
mined in order to maximize the achievable instantaneous secrecy rate.
Here, it strongly depends on the channel realizations and the delay of
the estimate, whether the IN or the AN protection scheme should be
applied.
Open Topics
The MISO WTC is quite well investigated nowadays. There are only few
open topics available for this scenario. One open question is whether it
is optimal to send the AN signal only into the null space of the intended
receiver or if it is better to accept some interference at the receiver in
order to achieve a higher disturbance at the eavesdropper. The results in
[Lin+13] indicate that a generalized AN signal, which is not restricted to
the null space of the intended receiver, achieves higher ergodic secrecy
rates. The influence of this generalized AN signal if applied to the
protection scheme presented in II still has to be analyzed.
More open topics are available if we focus on the two-hop relay WTC. A
precise characterization, whether the AN or the IN protection scheme
is preferable for certain channel conditions, is still open. Moreover, the
analysis in Part III considers only achievable instantaneous secrecy rates.
A measure like the secrecy outage probability would give a much better
understanding, how much information is leaked to the eavesdropper
if the link between relay and the eavesdropper is not perfectly known
at the transmitter. Additionally, other links like the direct link between
sender and eavesdropper may be only partially known. Whether the IN
protection scheme can be applied in this case needs to be investigated.

PART V
APPENDIX
A Proof for the MISO WTC under Fast Fading
Monotony of the Ergodic Secrecy Rate
(A.1) Lemma (Monotony ofRS(a) in a).
The function
RS(aw) =
[
log2
(
1 + aρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2)− Eg[log2(1 + aρ ∣∣gHw∣∣2)]]+
with a ≥ 0 is monotonically increasing in a. X
Proof.
In order to proof the monotony of RS(aw) in a, we need to distinguish
two cases.
First case |hHw|2 ≤ Eg
[|gHw|2]
In this case, RS(aw) is always zero due to the maximization function.
Second case |hHw|2 > Eg
[|gHw|2]
Here, RS(aw) gives always positive values. Therefore, we take a look at
the first derivative of RS(aw) with respect to a, which is given by
a
∂RS(aw)
∂a
=
1
ln 2
 aρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2
1 + aρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2 − Eg
[
aρ
∣∣gHw∣∣2
1 + aρ |gHw|2
]
=
1
ln 2
aρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2 + 1− 1
1 + aρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2 − Eg
[
aρ
∣∣gHw∣∣2 + 1− 1
1 + aρ |gHw|2
]
=
1
ln 2
1− 1
1 + aρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2 − Eg
[
1− 1
1 + aρ |gHw|2
]
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=
1
ln 2
Eg[ 1
1 + aρ |gHw|2
]
− 1
1 + aρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2

≥ 1
ln 2
 1
1 + aρEg
[
|gHw|2
] − 1
1 + aρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2
 , (A.1)
where we can multiply the derivative with a without loss of generality
as we are only interested in the monotonic behavior of the function.
Equation (A.1) follows by Jensen’s inequality.
This derivative is always non-negative for a ≥ 0, ρ > 0, and |hHw|2 ≥
Eg
[|gHw|2].
From the combination of both cases, we conclude that RS(aw) is mono-
tonically increasing in a. 
B Proofs for the MISO WTC under Slow
Fading
B.1 Equivalence of the Dual Problem
(B.1) Theorem.
Let {Fw} be a family of continuous distribution functions on R with index set
W . Then, the following two optimization problems are equivalent.
1. For  ∈ [0, 1] fixed, consider
max
w∈W
x s.t. Fw(x) = . (B.1)
2. For x ∈ R fixed, consider
min
w∈W
 s.t. Fw(x) = . (B.2)
X
Proof.
For  ∈ [0, 1] fixed consider x∗ to be the solution of Equation (B.1).
Then, there exist two disjoint setsW ′ = {w : Fw(x∗) = } andW ′′ = {w :
Fw(x
∗) 6= }withW = W ′∪W ′′. In particular, since Fw is monotonically
increasing for all w ∈W it holds
W ′′ = {w : Fw(x∗) > }.
Otherwise, x∗ would not be the solution of Equation (B.1). Therefore,
with x = x∗ fixed,  is the solution of Equation (B.2). To proof also
the converse, let x ∈ R be fixed and consider ∗ as the solution of
Equation (B.2). Using the same argumentation as for the first case, it can
be shown that x is the solution of Equation (B.1) given  = ∗. 
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B.2 Monotony of the Secrecy Rate
(B.2) Lemma (Monotony ofRS(a) in a).
For fixed g, the function
RS(aw) =
log2 1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2 a2
1 + ρ |gHw|2 a2

+
with a ≥ 0 is monotonically increasing in a. X
Proof.
In order to prove the monotony of RS(aw) in a, we have to distinguish
two cases.
First case |hHw|2 ≤ |gHw|2
In this case, RS(aw) = 0, independent of the value chosen for the
parameter a. This is due to the maximization function [·]+.
Second case |hHw|2 > |gHw|2
In this case, the first derivative with respect to a is given by
∂
∂a
RS(aw) =
2ρa
(∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2 − ∣∣gHw∣∣2)(
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2 a2)(1 + ρ |gHw|2 a2) ln 2 ,
which is always non-negative for a ≥ 0, ρ > 0, and |hHw|2 > |gHw|2.
From the combination of both cases, we conclude that RS(aw) is mono-
tonically increasing in a. 
104 B Proofs for the MISO WTC under Slow Fading
B.3 Uniqueness of the Solution
Proof of Corollary (7.9).
We consider the optimization problem
arg max
‖w‖2=1
RS s.t. Pr
log2 1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2
1 + ρ |gHw|2 < R

S
 = , (B.3)
which gives the optimal beamforming strategy for the maximization
problem in Equation (7.5), and we show the uniqueness of this beam-
forming strategy in three steps.
First step
The function f : R2+ → R with f(u, v) = log2 1+ρv1+ρu and ρ ∈ R+ is
differentiable and strictly decreasing in u for any v ∈ R+, since the first
derivative of f with respect to u is negative for all u ∈ R+
∂
∂u
f(u, v) = − ρ
(1 + ρu) ln 2
< 0.
Hence, it follows that the secrecy rate f(|hHw|2, |gHw|2) is strictly de-
creasing in |gHw|2.
Second step
The target secrecy rate RS can be expressed as R

S = log2
1+ρ|hHw|2
1+ρx
with x ∈ (0, |hHw|2]. Therewith, the inequality in the constraint of the
maximization problem in Equation (B.3) can be formulated as
log2
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2
1 + ρ |gHw|2 < log2
1 + ρ
∣∣∣hHw∣∣∣2
1 + ρx
⇔ ∣∣gHw∣∣2 > x.
Due to the strict monotony of f , the target secrecy rate RS can be max-
imized by minimizing x. Consequently, the maximization problem in
Equation (B.3) can be converted to the minimization problem
arg min
‖w‖2=1
x s.t. Pr
(∣∣gHw∣∣2 > x) = . (B.4)
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Third step
Using the parameterization in Equation (6.3) for the BV w and the proba-
bility distribution of |gHw|2, which is |gHw|2 ∼ χ22(|
√
2κ/1−κdHw|2), we
can express the probability constraint in Equation (B.4) as
 = 1− Pr
(∣∣gHw∣∣2 ≤ x) (B.5)
= Q1
(√
2κτ
1− κ ‖d‖ ,
√
2x
1− κ
)
(B.6)
with κ ∈ [0, 1), τ ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ (0, |hHw|2], where Q1 is the Marcum
Q-function of the first order.
SinceQ1 is a continuous distribution function, there exists for all  ∈ [0, 1]
a pair (x, τ) that fulfills the secrecy outage probability constraint. From
the monotony properties of the Marcum Q-function [SBZ10] follows that
for every fixed pair (x, ) we have at most one unique τ that fulfills the
secrecy outage probability constraint.
Hence, there exists only one pair (x∗, τ∗) that solves the minimization
problem in Equation (B.4) and thus the maximization problem in Equa-
tion (B.3). 
B.4 Proof of the Concavity
Proof of Concavity of Equation (7.16).
In order to show the concavity of |hHw(τ)|2 in τ , we compute its second
derivative with respect to τ and show that it is always negative. Using
the parameterization from Equation (6.3) for the beamformerw, we get
∣∣∣hHw(τ)∣∣∣2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣√τ h
HΠdh
‖Πdh‖ +
√
1− τ h
HΠ⊥d h∥∥∥Π⊥d h∥∥∥
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣√τ ‖Πdh‖+√1− τ ∥∥∥Π⊥d h∥∥∥∣∣∣2
= τ ‖Πdh‖2 + (1− τ)
∥∥∥Π⊥d h∥∥∥2
+ 2
√
τ
√
1− τ ‖Πdh‖
∥∥∥Π⊥d h∥∥∥ .
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The first derivative of |hHw(τ)|2 with respect to τ is calculated as
∂
∂τ
∣∣∣hHw(τ)∣∣∣2 = ‖Πdh‖2 + √1− τ√
τ
‖Πdh‖
∥∥∥Π⊥d h∥∥∥
−
√
τ√
1− τ ‖Πdh‖
∥∥∥Π⊥d h∥∥∥− ∥∥∥Π⊥d h∥∥∥2 . (B.7)
The second derivative with respect to τ is computed as
∂2
∂2τ
∣∣∣hHw(τ)∣∣∣2 = −1
2
‖Πdh‖
∥∥∥Π⊥d h∥∥∥√
τ3
√
(1− τ)3 ,
which is always negative for τ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, |hHw(τ)|2 is strictly
concave in τ . 
(B.3) Optimal Parameterization for BV.
The maximum of |hHw(τ)|2 can be found by setting Equation (B.7) equal
to zero
∂
∂τ
∣∣∣hHw(τ)∣∣∣2 = 0.
By solving this equation for τ , we get the solution
τ∗ =
‖Πdh‖2
‖h‖2 ,
which corresponds to MRT, i.e., w(τ∗) = wMRT. X
C Proofs for the Two-Way Relay WTC under
Full CSI
C.1 Monotony of the Achievable Secrecy Rate with AN
Proof of Proposition (10.2).
In order to prove the Optimization Problem (10.1), we need to show
that the function RANS is unimodal in pR over the range [0, PR] and has a
maximum.
First, let us determine the extreme values of the function RANS . For
convenience of notation, let us denote the effective received SNR at the
relay as
ρ˜ = ρPS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2
and the effectively received SNR at the eavesdropper in the first phase
as
ρ¯ = ρPS,2 ‖hE‖2 .
The first derivative of RANS with respect to pR is given by
∂RANS
∂pR
=
1
ln 2
ρ˜ρ(1+ρ¯ρ˜−ρ2‖gB‖2|gE |2p2R+ρ¯+ρ˜)(‖gB‖2ρ¯+‖gB‖2−|gE |2)
(1+ρ‖gB‖2pR+ρ˜)(1+ρ¯ρ˜+|gE |2pRρ+ρ¯+ρ˜)(‖gB‖2pRρ+1)(1+|gE |2pRρ+ρ¯)
.
(C.1)
Computing the zeros, we obtain
p˜R = ±
√
‖gB‖2 |gE |2 (ρ˜+ 1) (ρ¯+ 1)
ρ ‖gB‖2 |gE |2
.
Due to the fact that pR is a power value, the only feasible solution is the
positive zero.
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The derivative in Equation (C.1) is non-negative in the range pR ∈ [0, p˜R]
and therefore, the achievable secrecy rate RANS is monotonically increas-
ing in pR. Additionally, the derivative in Equation (C.1) is always non-
positive in the range pR ∈ [p˜R,∞], i.e., RANS is monotonically decreasing
in pR. From these two facts follows that the achievable secrecy rate RANS
is unimodal with a maximum at p˜R.
Due to the power constraint at the relay, the optimal power allocation is
given by
p∗R = min (p˜R, PR) . 
C.2 Positive Values of the Achievable Secrecy Rate with
AN
Proof of Proposition (10.7).
For the proof, we just need to calculate the zeros of the function RANS (ρ),
which are given by
ρ1 = 0 and
ρ2 =
|gE |2 − ‖gB‖2
PS,2 ‖gB‖2 ‖hE‖2
,
and to take a look at the monotonic behavior of RANS (ρ) in ρ.
The first derivative of the achievable secrecy rate RANS (ρ) with respect to
ρ is given by
∂RANS (ρ)
∂ρ
=
1
ln 2
ρβpR (t1 + t2 + t3 + t4) ,
where
t1 =
‖gB‖2 η
(
|gE |2 pR + η
)(
‖gB‖2 pR + β
)
ρ3
z
,
t2 =
2 ‖gB‖2 η
(
pR
(
‖gB‖2 + |gE |2
)
+ η + β
)
ρ2
z
,
t3 =
(
β
(
‖gB‖2 − |gE |2
)
+ pR
(
‖gB‖4 − |gE |4
)
+ η
(
4 ‖gB‖2 − |gE |2
))
ρ
z
,
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t4 =
2
(
‖gB‖2 − |gE |2
)
z
,
z =
(
1 + ρ
(
|gE |2 pR + η + β
)
+ ρ2ηβ
)(
1 + ρ
(
|gE |2 pR + η
))
·(
1 + ρpR ‖gB‖2
)(
1 + ρ
(
‖gB‖2 pR + β
))
,
β = PS,1
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF ∣∣∣2 , and
η = PS,2 ‖hE‖2 .
In order to analyze the monotonic behavior of the function, we need to
distinguish two cases.
First case ‖gB‖2 ≥ |gE |2
In this case, ρ2 is negative and therefore, the function RANS (ρ) should be
positive for all values ρ ≥ ρ1 = 0.
If we take a look at the first derivative, we can easily see, that all four
fractions t1 to t4 are positive and therefore, RANS (ρ) is monotonically
increasing in ρ.
Second case ‖gB‖2 < |gE |2
In this case, the function RANS (ρ) should become positive for all values
ρ ≥ ρ2 = |gE |
2−‖gB‖2
PS,2‖gB‖2‖hE‖2 .
In order to show this, we take a closer look on all values smaller than ρ2
and all values greater than ρ2.
a) 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ2
If ρ is in the interval [0, ρ2], the function RANS (ρ) is zero. This is due
to the maximization function [·]+.
a) ρ > ρ2
The first derivative of RANS (ρ) in ρ has a positive slope
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∂RANS (ρ)
∂ρ
∣∣∣
ρ=ρ2
=
(‖gB‖2−|gE |2)
2
βηPR‖gB‖2
|gE |2(η+PR(|gE |2−‖gB‖2))(η‖gB‖2+PR‖gB‖2(|gE |2−‖gB‖2)+β(|gE |2−‖gB‖2))
> 0.
The denominator is positive, as we regard the case ‖gB‖2 < |gE |2. The
numerator is always positive due to the square function. Therefore,
the achievable secrecy rate RANS (ρ) has a positive slope in the zero ρ2,
i.e., the function becomes positive for ρ > ρ2. 
D Proofs for the Two-Way Relay WTC under
Partial CSI
D.1 Optimal IN Transmit Signal
Proof of Proposition (11.1).
We prove this proposition by contradiction. Let us assume that Alice
uses a channel estimation γE to get the IN transmit signal
xn = −
√
αγEh
H
Rw
Eve
ZF
hHEw
Eve
MRT
x.
We can thenformulate following optimization problem.
(D.1) Optimization Problem.
We minimize the worst case leakage power over the estimated channel
min
γE
max
|∆gE |2≤
L(γE)
with
L(γE) =
∣∣∣hHEwEveMRTxn +√αgEhHRwEveZF x∣∣∣2
=
∣∣∣√α (gˆE + ∆gE − γE)hHRwEveZF x∣∣∣2 . (D.1)
X
We need to show that the leakage power is minimized if we choose γE
to the estimated channel gˆE , i.e.,
L(γ∗E = gˆE) ≤ L(γE) ∀γE .
Let us first examine the leakage power with γ∗E = gˆE . Using Equa-
tion (D.1) we get
max
|∆gE |2≤
L(γ∗E = gˆE) = max|∆g2E|≤
∣∣∣√α (∆gE)hHRwEveZF x∣∣∣2
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gˆE
√

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γE
Figure D.1: Illustration of the estimated channel gˆE , the estimation error
 and a suboptimal estimation γE = gˆE + ζ.
= α
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF x∣∣∣2 .
If we now take a look at some other γE = gˆE + ζ, where ζ is some
estimation error with |ζ|2 ≤ , Equation (D.1) becomes
max
|∆gE |2≤
L(γE = gˆE + ζ)
= max
|∆gE |2≤
∣∣∣√α (∆gE − ζ)hHRwEveZF x∣∣∣2
=
(
+ |ζ|2
)
α
∣∣∣hHRwEveZF x∣∣∣2 .
It is easy to see that L(γ∗E = gˆE) ≤ L(γE = gˆE + ζ) and therefore it holds
that L(gˆE) ≤ L(γE), ∀γE . The used estimates for the proof are illustrated
in Figure D.1. 
D.2 Optimal Power Allocation for the IN Scheme
Proof of Proposition (11.5).
In order to obtain the results given in Table 11.1, we take the first deriva-
tive of the achievable secrecy rate RpCSIS with regard to the power at the
relay pR, which is given by
∂RpCSIS
∂pR
= t1 + t2 + t3 + t4, (D.2)
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where ρ˜ is defined in Equation (11.2),
t1 =
(ρ˜+ 1)
2
ρρ˜
(
‖gB‖2 − 
)
z
,
t2 =
ρ3p2Rρ˜ ‖gB‖2
(
|g˜E |4 −  ‖gB‖2
)
z
,
t3 =
2ρ2pRρ˜ ‖gB‖2 (1 + ρ˜)
(
|g˜E |2 − 
)
z
,
t4 =
ρ3p2Rρ˜
2 ‖gB‖2 
(
|g˜E |2 − ‖gB‖2
)
z
, and
z =
(
ρ˜+ ρpR ‖gB‖2 + 1
)(
ρpR ‖gB‖2 + 1
)
·(
ρpRρ˜+ ρ˜+ ρpR |g˜E |2 + 1
)(
ρ˜+ ρpR |g˜E |2 + 1
)
.
Furthermore, we denote the maximal power, which the relay can use
such that the transmitter is still able to neutralize the data signal in the
second phase as
pmaxR =
PS,2 ‖hE‖2
gˆE
(
1 +
1
ρ˜
)
.
We analyze the following six cases, which can be split into two groups:
1. ‖gB‖2 > 
For all cases with ‖gB‖2 > , t1 is positive and therefore the func-
tion RpCSIS is monotonically increasing in pR at the point pR = 0,
i.e., RpCSIS is positive for certain values of pR.
In order to find the optimal pR we need to take a closer look at the
three following cases.
i) |g˜E |2 > ‖gB‖2 > 
In this case, all four fractions in Equation (D.2) are positive and
therefore RpCSIS is monotonic increasing in pR. The optimal
power allocation at the relay with regard to the IN power
constraint is then given as
p∗R = p
max
R .
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Taking the power constraint at the relay into account, the
optimal power allocation is given by
p∗R = min (p
max
R , PR) .
ii) ‖gB‖2 > |g˜E |2 > 
We need to distinguish two additional cases.
a)
(
|g˜E |4 + |g˜E |2 ρ˜
)
≥  ‖gB‖2 (1 + ρ˜):
Again, all four fractions in Equation (D.2) are positive.
Therefore, RpCSIS is monotonically increasing in pR and
the optimal power allocation at the relay is given by
p∗R = p
max
R .
As before, if we consider the power constraint at the relay
the optimal power allocation is given by
p∗R = min (p
max
R , PR) .
b)
(
|g˜E |4 + |g˜E |2 ρ˜
)
<  ‖gB‖2 (1 + ρ˜):
In this case, the function RpCSIS is unimodal with a positive
maximum at
p˜R =
(1+ρ˜)
(√
‖gB‖2(ρ˜(‖gB‖2−)+s)s+‖gB‖2(|g˜E |2−)
)
ρ‖gB‖2(ρ˜s+‖gB‖2−|g˜E |4)
,
where s = ‖gB‖2 − |g˜E |2. Therefore, the optimal power
allocation at the relay is given by
p∗R = min (p˜R, p
max
R , PR) .
The first argument of the minimization function is the opti-
mal power allocation point p˜R while the second argument
is the maximum power that can be used so that Alice is still
able to neutralize the data signal at the eavesdropper with
full power PS,2 in the second phase. The third argument is
due to the power constraint at the relay.
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iii) ‖gB‖2 >  > |g˜E |2
The function RpCSIS is unimodal and for small pR monoton-
ically increasing (and positive) and becomes monotonically
decreasing with growing pR. The maximum is again at p˜R as
given in Item 1(ii)b. Therefore, the optimal power allocation
at the relay is again given by
p∗R = min (p˜R, p
max
R , PR) .
2. ‖gB‖2 ≤ 
For ‖gB‖2 ≤ , the function RpCSIS is monotonically decreasing for
small pR. Whether the function becomes positive at some point,
we will analyze in the following.
iv) |g˜E |2 >  > ‖gB‖2
In this case, the secrecy rate RpCSIS is unimodal. As long as
t2 + t3 + t4 is smaller than−t1, the function is decreasing. The
local minimum is achieved for t2 + t3 + t4 = −t1. From this
point on the function is monotonically increasing.
This behavior can easily be observed by having a close look
on the fractions t1 to t4. t1 is independent of the power at the
relay. Therefore, for small values of pR, t2 + t3 + t4 is smaller
than −t1 and thus RpCSIS is decreasing in pR. Furthermore, all
of these rate values are negative. With growing pR, t2 + t3 + t4
becomes greater than −t1 and the function is monotonically
increasing. The rate values become positive for
pR >
(ρ˜+ 1)
(
‖gB‖2 − 
)
ρ ‖gB‖2
(
− |g˜E |2
) .
Let us denote this threshold as p0R =
(ρ˜+1)(‖gB‖2−)
ρ‖gB‖2(−|g˜E |2)
.
As the function is monotonically increasing for values be-
tween p0R and p
max
R , the optimal p
∗
R is p
∗
R = p
max
R if p
max
R > p
0
R.
Otherwise p∗R = 0 and therefore the secrecy rate is also
RpCSIS = 0.
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Let us summarize these results and include the power con-
straint at the relay. The optimal power allocation at the relay
in the second phase can then be written as
p∗R =

pmaxR if
(ρ˜+1)(‖gB‖2−)
ρ‖gB‖2(−|g˜E |2)
< pmaxR < PR
PR if
(ρ˜+1)(‖gB‖2−)
ρ‖gB‖2(−|g˜E |2)
< PR ≤ pmaxR
0 otherwise
.
v)  > |g˜E |2 > ‖gB‖2
In this case, the secrecy rate is always zero, as the limit for pR
to infinity is always negative
lim
pR→∞
RpCSIS = log2
(
ρ˜ |g˜E |2 + |g˜E |2
ρ˜+ |g˜E |2
)
≤ 0.
vi)  ≥ ‖gB‖2 ≥ |g˜E |2
In this case, all four fractions in Equation (D.2) are negative
and therefore RpCSIS is monotonically decreasing in pR. The
optimal power allocation at the relay is then given by p∗R = 0,
i.e., it is best not to send at all.
As mentioned in Remark (11.3), the optimal power allocation p∗S,2 for
the transmission of the IN signal in the second phase corresponds to the
the optimal power allocation p∗R and follows directly from the IN power
constraint in Equation (11.1). 
E Further Contributions
Within this thesis, the focus is on beamforming strategies and protection
mechanisms in order to maximize the secrecy rate in simple system mod-
els under partial CSI. The two chosen system models are the Gaussian
wiretap channel and the Gaussian two-hop relay wiretap channel.
During my time at the Chair for Communications Theory, I also worked
on following papers that did not contribute to this thesis.
The publication [Ger08] results from my student project supervised by Dr.
Sebastian Clauß and Prof. Andreas Pfitzmann. The paper discusses and
compares two different approaches to encrypt RDF-Graphs (Resource
Description Framework).
[Ger08] Sabrina Gerbracht. “Possibilities to Encrypt an RDF-
Graph”. In: Proc. of International Conference on Information
& Communication Technologies: from Theory to Applications
(ICTTA). 2008
In [JWG10], an overview on physical layer secrecy is given. The book
chapter focuses mainly on achievable secrecy rates in different single
user and multi user scenarios.
[JWG10] Eduard A. Jorswieck, Anne Wolf, and Sabrina Gerbracht.
“Secrecy on the Physical Layer in Wireless Networks”. In:
Trends in Telecommunications Technologies. Ed. by Christos J.
Bouras. INTECH, 2010. Chap. 20, pp. 413–435
In [JG09], the sum secrecy rate of the Gaussian two-user Orthogonal
Frequency-Division Multiplexing (OFDM) broadcast WTC is maximized
over the power. It could be shown, that the OFDM subcarriers can
be divided in two subsets. The first subset contains all subcarriers,
where the channel from the transmitter to the first receiver is better. All
other subcarriers are collected in the second subset. Messages to the
first receiver can now be transmitted confidentially over the channels
in subset one, while the confidential messages for the second receiver
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are transmitted over the channels in subset two. The power over all
subcarriers is allocated by a water filling algorithm.
[JG09] Eduard A. Jorswieck and Sabrina Gerbracht. “Secrecy Rate
Region of Downlink OFDM Systems: Efficient Resource Al-
location”. In: Proc. of International OFDM-Workshop (InOWo).
2009
In [HJG13], the possibilities of IN in the multi-carrier multi-antenna
multi-user relay channel are investigated. A journal version of this
scenario is published in [HJE13].
[HJG13] Ka-Ming (Zuleita) Ho, Eduard A. Jorswieck, and Sabrina
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Car-rier Interference Channel”. In: IEEE Journal on Selected
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In [Ric+15] an achievable secrecy rate for the two-way relay channel
under usage of physical layer network coding is established.
[Ric+15] Johannes Richter, Christian Scheunert, Sabrina
Engelmann, and Eduard A. Jorswieck. “Secrecy in the
Two-Way Relay Channel with Compute-and-Forward”.
In: Proc. of IEEE Communications Theory Symposium (ICC).
2015
Another topic in physical layer security, that is currently discussed in
literature with increasing interest, is the generation of secret keys from
channel parameters. In [JWE13], the generation of secret keys in the
MIMO channel with precoding at both Alice and Bob is investigated.
The special case, where one communication partner has only a single
antenna, i.e., MISO/SIMO, is analyzed in [EWJ14]. With this simplified
system model, it is possible to characterize the optimal precoding matrix
in order to maximize the secret key rate.
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